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GLOSSARY
In this brief, appellant and cross-appellee, Kelly Laws, will be called “Laws,”
appellee and cross-appellant, Willie Grayeyes, will be called “Grayeyes,” and the
Seventh Judicial District Court, State of Utah, will be called “Judge Torgerson” or the
“lower court.” All statutory references, except where otherwise indicated, are to the
Utah Code, 2018 version. All constitutional references, except where otherwise
indicated, are to the Utah Constitution. The Record on Appeal is abbreviated as ROA.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues on this appeal and cross-appeal are whether Laws has standing,
whether Laws is barred by untimeliness and laches, whether Judge Torgerson’s ruling
that Grayeyes, for electoral purposes, resides in San Juan County should be sustained on
appeal, and whether Judge Torgerson’s denial of Grayeyes’s request for attorney fees and
court costs should be reversed and remanded. The standard of review for these issues is
set forth below.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal arises from an election contest. Laws ran against, and lost to,
Grayeyes in the 2018 race for San Juan County Commissioner, District 2. After losing,
Laws sued Grayeyes, claiming he was not qualified as a candidate or eligible to serve as a
commissioner for want of residency, invoking §§20A-4-402(1)(b) and 20A-4-402(1)(g).
ROA at 001-0080 and 001392-001473.
The complaint was filed December 28, 2018. As directed by statute, §20A-4404(1)(b)(ii), Judge Torgerson conducted a trial within 30 days on January 22, 2019.
19 | P a g e

ROA at 001636-001642 and 001882-002247. He received all evidence which each side
proffered with one exception: portions, but not all, of a report prepared by a San Juan
County Deputy Sheriff, Colby Turk. ROA at 001916 and 001922-001927.
After trial, on January 29, 2019, Judge Torgerson refused to annul the election,
§20A-4-404(4)(c)(i), having determined that Grayeyes was a legal resident of San Juan
County at all applicable times. The Ruling and Order is attached as Appendix A.
After winning at trial, Grayeyes filed an application for attorney fees and court
costs. He argued entitlement to such an award on the basis of equitable principles, the socalled bad faith and private attorney general doctrines. He also contended that legislative
enactments that modified or eclipsed these doctrines violated the separation of powers
and are unconstitutional. He further requested an opportunity to take discovery on the
question of bad faith and for an evidentiary hearing to prove his case. ROA at 001704001831, 001867-001872, 002275-002276, and 002282-002286.
On June 20, 2019, ignoring Grayeyes’s requests for discovery and a hearing,
Judge Torgerson denied the application for fees and costs, ruling that §§78B-5-825 and
78B-5-825.5 debarred the relief which Grayeyes sought. The Order Denying Application
for Attorney Fees and Costs is attached as Appendix B.
Laws filed a notice of appeal from the January 29, 2019, Ruling and Order that
affirmed the election of Grayeyes. ROA at 001698-001701. Grayeyes filed a notice of
cross-appeal from the June 20, 2019, Order Denying Application for Attorney Fees and
Costs. Because Grayeyes’s notice was not included in the ROA, a copy is attached as
Appendix C.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In connection with Laws’s appeal, Grayeyes contends that it should be dismissed
because Laws lacks standing and, in the alternative, on the basis of untimeliness and
laches. If the merits of the appeal are reached, Judge Torgerson’s ruling on residency
should be sustained. Laws failed in his duty to marshal all evidentiary submissions for
purposes of this appeal. He also had insufficient evidence to prove his case in the lower
court. The evidence showed that Grayeyes was a qualified candidate for the office of
county commissioner and this outcome was not affected by any evidentiary rulings by
Judge Torgerson.
In connection with Grayeyes’s cross-appeal, he argues that Judge Torgerson
applied an unconstitutional and incorrect legal standard in refusing to award attorney fees
and costs. Sections 78B-5-825 and 78B-5-825.5, as applied by Judge Torgerson, offend
Art. V and Art. VIII by interfering with the judicial branch’s inherent power to regulate
attorneys and award fees. Judge Torgerson’s decision respecting attorney fees and court
costs accordingly should be reversed and remanded so that he might apply legal standards
which are not cabined by the language in these statutes.
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ARGUMENT
LAWS LACKS STANDING1
Laws claims standing under §20A-4-403(1)(a) which provides that a “registered
voter” may file a verified complaint under the election contest statute. In Utah, however,
such statutory standing is only a threshold requirement that must be pleaded and satisfied
with proof. It is not the end of the matter, because the legislature, by statute (and in light
of the constitutional principles which mandate a separation of powers, e.g., of Water
Rights, 2010 UT 14, ¶12), may not expand the judicial branch’s subject-matter
jurisdiction. Therefore, in addition to statutory standing, Laws also must show that he
satisfies Utah’s tests respecting constitutional standing. 2
In the proceedings before Judge Torgerson, Laws’s pleadings did not allege that
he had suffered a constitutionally cognizable injury which is redressable through judicial

1

Grayeyes broached the issues of subject-matter-jurisdiction and standing in the lower
court, ROA at 0098ff, 001275ff, 001570ff, although these questions can be raised at any
time, even on appeal, e.g., Brown v. Division of Water Rights, 2010 UT 14, ¶13. Motions
to dismiss on the basis of standing present questions of law which this Court reviews for
correctness. E.g., Haik v. Jones, 2018 UT 39, ¶9.
E.g., Brown v. Cox, 2017 UT 3, ¶¶12-14 (legislature, by statute, may not expand Utah
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction); Haik v. Jones, 2018 UT 39, ¶¶17-22 (“person
aggrieved” statutory standing analyzed pursuant to constitutional standing tests); id. at
¶41 & nn. 10, 11, and 12, citing, among other cases, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct.
1540, 1549 (2016) (Associate C. J. Lee, concurring opinion); In re Questar Gas Co.,
2007 UT 79, ¶¶58-62 & n. 65 (statute expressly grants utility’s “stockholders” right of
review of PSC order in Utah Supreme Court, but these stockholders still must prove
standing under traditional constitutional tests set forth in Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club
v. Utah Air Quality Board, 2006 UT 74, ¶19, and cases such as Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990), respecting a distinct, palpable injury, causation, and
redressability); Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) (legislature cannot
create standing through enactment of Utah Declaratory Judgment Statute).
2
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action. ROA at 001ff and 00139ff. Nor did he offer any proof along these lines. ROA at
002043 and 002041-002042. His appeal, therefore, must be dismissed for these reasons
alone. But could Laws make (and prove) such allegations under the circumstances of this
case?
He might blame his electoral loss on Grayeyes’s want of residency. But any
causal nexus between Grayeyes’s home and Laws’s defeat is attenuated at best. Such a
loss, moreover, is not redressable, since §20A-4-404(4)(c)(i), under the circumstances of
this case, authorizes judges only to nullify an election and not to award victory to
candidates who come in second place. Laws admits as much when, through his
testimony and pleadings in the lower court, he disclaimed any right to the office which he
failed to win. ROA at 002041-002042 and “Petitioner’s Amended Memorandum
Opposing Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Laches,” at page 9, ROA at
001527-001528.
Laws also might argue that his vote doesn’t matter if an unqualified candidate is
allowed to take office. This appears, after all, to be the explanation for §20A-4-403(1)(a)
and “registered voter” statutory standing. Ignoring the point that this argument is
something of a non sequitur, it is clear that Laws’s concern about his ability to vote for
legal candidates is not the kind of “distinct” and “palpable” or “particularized” injury
which creates standing in Utah. E.g., Council of Holladay City v. Larkin, 2004 UT 24,
¶27 (mayor of city lacked standing to challenge certain aspects of proposed change to
form of government in connection with election contest because “[i]t is generally
insufficient for a plaintiff to assert only a general interest he shares in common with
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members of the public at large[ ]”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); York
v. Unqualified Washington County Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 679, 680 (Utah 1986)
(citizen challenged election of county officials on grounds they were unqualified to hold
office; dismissal of challenge for want of standing upheld on appeal; plaintiff “does not
distinguish himself from any other resident, property owner, or taxpayer of Washington
County . . . His amended petition alleges that other persons in similar circumstances will
suffer the same unidentified jeopardy to their legal rights and status . . .”). 3

3

In Gregory v. Shurtleff, 2013 UT 18, ¶94, Justice Lee cited York for the proposition that,
“The holdings in most of our cases (if not always the dicta) have effectively maintained
traditional limitations on standing. In Jenkins v. Swan, for example, we foreclosed
standing in cases where ‘other potential plaintiffs with a more direct interest in [the]
particular question’ exist. 675 P.2d 1145, 1151 (Utah 1983). This holding appropriately
prefers parties that meet traditional standing requirements. See id. at 1150 (‘[T]his Court
will not readily relieve a plaintiff of the . . . requirement of showing a real and personal
interest in the dispute[ ]’).”
See also, Haik v. Jones, 2018 UT 39, ¶18 (citations omitted); Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d
1145, 1152 (Utah 1983) (plaintiff had no standing to be private enforcer of conflict-ofinterest requirements for state legislators); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974) (plaintiffs lacked standing in suit to enforce Art. I, §6, cl.
2 of United States Constitution; “[t]he only interest all citizens share in the claim
advanced by respondents is one which presents injury in the abstract . . . [The] claimed
nonobservance [of the clause], standing alone, would adversely affect only the
generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance[ ]”); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-577 (1992) (“[w]e have consistently held that a plaintiff
raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to
his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and
seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at
large—does not state an Article III case or controversy[ ]”), cited approvingly in In re
Questar Gas Co., 2007 UT 79, ¶61 & n. 65 (holding that, although “stockholders” and
“aggrieved persons” literally are identified in statutes conferring individual standing and
vouchsafing judicial review, as appellants in Supreme Court, they failed constitutional
tests, such as those found in Lujan, and, thus, had no standing to appeal).
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The desire for “legal” candidates isn’t an interest peculiar to voters in general or
Laws in particular, since those who abstain from the polls, as well as felons or aliens who
cannot cast a ballot, care just as much about the qualifications of officials who preside in
a commonwealth. Indeed, it isn’t even an interest which affected Laws in the 2018
election, since presumably he voted for himself rather than that “other fellow” whom he
believed to be “unlawful.”
Moreover, this result is compelled by analogy to Utah R. Civ. Pro. 65B(c)(1)
which governs the issuance of extraordinary writs, including writs of quo warranto,
which are used – as in this case -- to challenge entitlements to public office. Case law
from Utah and other jurisdictions holds that registered voters or local taxpayers, without
more, cannot invoke a court’s jurisdiction through quo warranto because they do not
have an interest in these controversies which is “distinct from the general public.” State
ex rel. Murdock v. Ryan, 125 P. 666, 668-669 (Utah 1912). See also, Newman v. United
States of America ex rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537, 545-550 (1915). Indeed, without a
limitation on standing such as this, elected candidates could be hounded out of office
through a multitude of suits by registered voters, id. at 546, and the election contest
statute, which essentially is a surrogate for Rule 65B(c)(1) and writs of quo warranto,
might be unconstitutional under Art. VIII, §§3, 5, and 4, pursuant to the rationale of
precedents such as Barnes v. Lehi City, 279 P. 878, 881, and 882-883 (Utah 1929).
Laws’s own testimony at trial, in large measure, reflected these realities. He
insisted that the Lieutenant Governor should have taken the Grayeyes case in vindication
of the rights of the public at large: “You know, it seems kind of interesting that this is set
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up this way, that it becomes my financial burden to prove somebody’s residency in the
state of Utah instead of the lieutenant governor’s office stepping in and honoring their
duly sworn obligation to protect the sovereignty of our elections. So the answer to your
question is yes, you’re damn rights I’m concerned about the costs of it because it is very
costly to prove something that the State of Utah should have done for me.” ROA at
002051.
In short, Laws’s defeat in the election was not caused by any lack of residency on
Grayeyes’s part, nor could it have been redressed by any means available to Judge
Torgerson under the election code. Laws has disclaimed any right to occupy the office of
commissioner in all events. He has, moreover, only a “generalized” interest, shared with
the San Juan County community at large, in questioning the residency of Grayeyes as a
qualified candidate. At trial, Laws produced no evidence, other than his registration as a
voter, to prove standing on any other basis. Accordingly, Laws lacks standing and the
appeal should be dismissed.
LAWS WAS UNTIMELY AND BARRED BY LACHES 4
Judge Torgerson ruled that Laws’s complaint was untimely and barred on account
of laches. This ruling should be affirmed on appeal.

4

Grayeyes raised the issue of timeliness and laches in the lower court. ROA at 00162ff.
Insofar as this presents a question of timeliness under §20A-9-202(5), it concerns
interpretation of Utah law and is reviewed for correctness. E.g., Adams v. Swensen, 2005
UT 8, ¶7. And to the extent it presents a question of fact, Judge Torgerson’s findings on
this point may not be overturned absent a showing that they were clearly erroneous. E.g.,
Harding v. Bell, 57 P.3d 1093, 1097 (Utah 2002).
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Challenges to a candidate’s qualifications are governed, in the first instance, by
§20A-9-202(5). Before filing a declaration of candidacy, each candidate must meet the
“legal requirements” of that office, §20A-9-201(1)(b), which, for county commissioners,
include durational residency of one year prior to the election in question, §17-16-1(1)(b).
In light of §20A-9-407(3)(a) and the facts of this case, Grayeyes’s deadline for filing a
declaration of candidacy was March 15, 2018, a deadline which he met by filing on
March 9, 2018. The statutorily prescribed form of declaration, §20A-9-201(7)(a), and the
one used by Grayeyes, require a candidate to “solemnly swear,” under oath, that he meets
the legal requirements for the office being sought and to affirm his residency. Before
receiving Grayeyes’s declaration of candidacy, the filing officer, in this case, a deputy at
the San Juan County Clerk’s office, read “the constitutional and statutory requirements
for the office” to Grayeyes who, in turn, affirmed that, as a candidate, he met those
requirements. §20A-9-201(3)(a)(i).
Once submitted, a declaration of candidacy, including its affirmation of residency,
is “valid unless a written objection is filed” with the filing officer. §20A-9-202(5)(a)
(emphasis supplied). Any such objection must be made no later than 5 days after the last
day on which declarations of candidacy may be filed. Id. In this case, that deadline,
computed pursuant to §20A-1-401, at the latest, was March 20, 2018. Since a declaration
of candidacy in effect requires an affirmation respecting residency, a lack of residency
obviously is a ground for objection. It is undisputed in our case that Laws did not timely
file an objection to Grayeyes’s declaration of candidacy under §20A-9-202(5).
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However, where objections are made on a timely basis, the election official
“immediately” must communicate any such objection to the affected candidate and
furthermore must resolve that objection within 48 hours after receiving it. §20A-9202(5)(b). An election official’s decision respecting matters of form is final, §20A-9202(5)(d)(i), but determinations of substance are reviewable, if prompt application for
review is made, before a district judge, §20A-9-202(5)(d)(ii). As an alternate remedy
where objections are sustained, candidates may amend the declaration or file a new one,
so long as this is done within three days of the election official’s decision. §20A-9202(5)(c).
Timing is critical when treating these objections. After filing his declaration, a
candidate must invest days of effort and lots of money in pre-convention campaigning.
Grayeyes thus filed his declaration on March 9, so that he could garner sufficient
delegates to achieve nomination at the Democratic Party Convention held on March 23.
Convention dates in fact are fixed in relation to the §20A-9-202(5) procedures, so that
parties and delegates, in the exercise of their First Amendment associational rights, may
know beforehand that their choice of candidate won’t easily be derailed after the fact. For
example, if an objection to Grayeyes’s declaration of candidacy had been timely filed by
March 20, it would have been resolved not later than March 22, in time for consideration
by delegates to the Democratic Party Convention which nominated Grayeyes on March
23. And a candidate who succeeds at convention will want the same certainty before
investing even more heavily in the time and money – and in the exercise of equally vital
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First Amendment rights to solicit votes – that are required to mount a campaign for a
June primary or a November election.
Moreover, §20A-9-202(5) maximizes the prompt resolution of candidate
qualifications, early in the election season, because otherwise Utah might face
constitutional challenges over delayed access to campaign fora, delays which prejudice
the rights of candidates, under First Amendment principles, to have a full and fair
opportunity to win at the ballot box, cf. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 790-793
(1983) (discussing importance of temporal considerations for voters and candidates in
election contests).
The importance of timing expressly is written or implicitly understood, not simply
from the real-world election context and constitutional constraints described above, but
also in light of §20A-9-202(5)’s language. Declarations of candidacy with their
affirmations of residency are valid unless an objection is filed within a 5-day deadline. If
objections are timely filed, the election official “shall” resolve them within 48 hours. If
sustained, candidates are given three days to cure or re-file, or, in the event judicial
review is desired, it is available on condition that a petition to the district court
“promptly” is lodged.
Utah’s case law reinforces the timing imperatives of §20A-9-202(5). Declarations
of candidacy themselves must be timely filed – and candidates who miss their filing
deadline are shown no mercy and left out in the cold. See, Anderson v. Cook, 130 P.2d
278, 282-283 (Utah 1942). This Court has adhered to this view even where the interested
parties have acted in good faith or substantial equities otherwise would excuse tardiness.
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See, Utah State Democratic Committee v. Monson, 652 P.2d 890, 891-893 (Utah 1982).
Indeed, in Monson, calling the statute regulating declarations of candidacy “the most
important step mandated by the legislature” in the electoral process, the Court stressed
that its timing provisions were compulsory and could not be construed away on equitable
or other grounds. Id. at 893. See also, Wood v. Cowan, 250 P. 979, 981-982 (Utah 1926)
(nomination certificate was late by one day because of confusion over interpretation of
election code provision respecting computation of time; statutory deadline is mandatory
and late filing properly refused by elections official). 5 These precedents, although not
dealing directly with objections to declarations of candidacy, nevertheless show that the
Utah election code, and case law construing it, will not countenance any shilly-shallying
when candidates’ rights are in the dock. 6
Accordingly, March 9, 2018, was the earliest opportunity for Laws to object to the
candidacy of Grayeyes on grounds of non-residency in light of §20A-9-202(5). Laws
admitted at trial that he was aware of residency concerns respecting Grayeyes at that
time. ROA at 002041-002042 and 002045-002046. At any time, from March 9, 2018,

5

This Court abjured enforcement of the filing deadline for declarations of candidacy in
Clegg v. Bennion, 247 P.2d 614, 614-616 (Utah 1952), distinguishing Anderson, because
the election official in Clegg gave candidates a filing deadline which was different from
the statutory deadline. In Monson, however, the Court declined to follow Clegg and
adhered to its earlier holding in Anderson.
6

Anderson, Monson, and Wood are consistent with other Utah cases which hold that preelection timing statutes – because they may impact the electorate at large – are mandatory
measures to be strictly enforced. See, e.g., Pugh v. Draper City, 114 P.3d 546, 548-549
(Utah 2005) (campaign disclosure deadline not met by one day and city recorder’s
decision to remove candidate from ballot upheld).
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through election day, November 6, 2018, Laws could have objected to Grayeyes’s
candidacy on residency grounds, using other vehicles in the election code, such as the
procedures given in §§20A-1-801, et seq., §20A-1-404, and §§20A-4-402, et seq. At trial
he testified that he remained aware of residency concerns surrounding his opponent’s
campaign for all of these eight months -- because of an ongoing controversy between
John David Nielson, the San Juan County Clerk and Grayeyes, wherein Nielson was
endeavoring to kick Grayeyes off the ballot -- an awareness so keen and concerning that
it prompted Laws to investigate the residency issue for himself during this period. ROA
at 002042 and 002047-002048.
In June 2018, the controversy between Nielson and Grayeyes landed in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah, Judge David Nuffer presiding. In early
August 2018, Judge Nuffer ruled that Nielson’s efforts against Grayeyes constituted a
denial of due process and enjoined Nielson to put Grayeyes on the November ballot.
Laws testified at trial that he was aware of Judge Nuffer’s injunction on or about the date
it was issued. ROA at 002047-002048. And he admitted further that, on September 5,
2018, while canvassing for votes at Navajo Mountain, his suspicions respecting
Grayeyes’s qualifications as commission candidate further were aroused when he went to
Grayeyes’s home and was told by a stranger whom he met at the door that Grayeyes was
not present. ROA at 002059-002063. Indeed, so much publicity was given to the
Grayeyes campaign and these residency concerns, all but the most detached citizens of
San Juan County (and especially a campaign opponent) must have been aware that his

31 | P a g e

qualifications as a candidate were being placed at issue – but without resolution in court
or by other means. ROA at 00180-001263.
Notwithstanding this awareness and his professed concern respecting the
residency issue, for almost eight months (March 9 to November 6), Laws did not act.
Even when it became apparent that the misbegotten challenge through the clerk’s office
would terminate in a finding of constitutional violations and a preliminary injunction
from Judge Nuffer in Grayeyes’s favor, Laws did not act. Even after that injunction was
entered on August 9, 2018, putting Grayeyes on the November ballot, Laws did not act.
And even after visiting the Grayeyes residence, encountering a stranger there on
September 5, 2018, Laws remained immobile.
In his principal brief, Laws belatedly argues that he relied on the Clerk’s
investigation (launched through the complaint of Wendy Black) to resolve the residency
issue, but he did not give testimony along this line at trial and Judge Torgerson made no
finding to this effect in his ruling. The argument is misleading, moreover, because, as
shown from the docket report in the federal case,7 (1) the Black complaint, with Nielson’s
connivance, was concealed from the public and Grayeyes until it was reframed and filed
much later as a challenge to Grayeyes’s status as a voter under §20A-3-202.3, rather than
his qualifications as a candidate under §20A-9-202(5), (2) Nielson’s adjudication of
Black’s complaint was first interrupted and then derailed by the litigation before Judge

7

The case is styled as Grayeyes, et al. v. Cox, et al., civ. no. 4:18-cv-00041-DN (United
States District Court for the District of Utah). The Court may take judicial notice of the
contents of this docket including Judge Nuffer’s preliminary injunction. E.g., Fitzgerald
v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301, 305 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
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Nuffer, litigation which did not treat the state law residency issue, instead examining
federal constitutional claims, and (3), in all events, Laws knew that Judge Nuffer’s
injunction, in early August, had put Grayeyes on the ballot, keeping the residency
question alive for those, like Laws, who believed it should be answered.
Perhaps Laws gambled that he would win the election. But, if so, that proved to
be a bad bet. He lost by a vote of 973 to 814. But whatever his pre-election intentions
may have been, it is undisputed that Laws waited until after the election to act – first by
filing a petition challenging Grayeyes’s residency with the Lieutenant Governor pursuant
to §§20A-1-801, et seq., on November 30, 2018, and then by serving a complaint in this
lawsuit pursuant to §§20A-4-402, et seq., on the day Grayeyes was sworn into office,
January 7, 2019. By seeking a couple of mulligans, one in an administrative proceeding
and another before Judge Torgerson, Laws apparently sought to hedge his election bets
on multiple fronts for a second time.
Not everyone, however, sees the electoral process as a gaming opportunity. It
should go without saying that elections are designed to give voters a choice among
candidates, such as Laws and Grayeyes -- and in order to ensure that choice and facilitate
the choosing process in the 2018 election for San Juan County Commissioner in District
2, state and local governments, government officials, political parties, non-profit entities,
legal representatives, judicial personnel, and the candidates themselves invest enormous
amounts of time, energy, resources, and money. Laws’s claims for relief in this appeal, if
granted, will put the ideals and efforts of all these parties in interest to naught. Indeed,
but for Laws’s dilatory challenge to Grayeyes’s residency, the San Juan County
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Democratic Party could have found a candidate replacing Grayeyes in the 2018 race.
§§20A-1-501(1)(b) and 20A-5-409.
Under these circumstances, Judge Torgerson’s determination that Laws was guilty
of laches and that, for this reason, among others, his complaint should be dismissed
cannot be surprising. Election contests under §20A-4-402 are equitable proceedings, e.g.,
Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, ¶23, and, therefore, principles of equity, including laches,
will block petitioners who fail “to exercise reasonable diligence” in asserting rights,
regardless of any applicable statute of limitations. In Swensen, for example, a timely
notice of appeal – a jurisdictional deadline – had been filed, but the Court nevertheless
ruled that laches remained as a viable bar to the appellate process. Id. Thus, Laws cannot
escape the perils wrought by his pre-election delays, even though he may have brought
this action under a statute which expressly contemplates post-election litigation within 40
days of an official canvass. A petitioner seeking relief in an election controversy actually
may be right on the merits, but still should have his claim dismissed under the doctrine of
laches when he fails to assert that claim at the earliest possible opportunity. See, In re
Cook, 882 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1994) (discussed below).
Laches is especially relevant in election contests because the voiding of an
election is a “’drastic if not staggering’ remedy” with an “extremely disruptive effect”
that wreaks havoc on the body politic. Soules v. Kauaians for Nukolii Campaign
Committee, 849 F.2d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). In addition, “the
courts have been wary lest the granting of post-election relief encourage[s] sandbagging
on the part of wily plaintiffs. As the Fourth Circuit put it, the ‘failure to require pre34 | P a g e

election adjudication would permit, if not encourage, parties who could raise a claim to
lay by and gamble upon receiving a favorable decision of the electorate and then, upon
losing, seek to undo the ballot results in a court action.’” Id. (Citations omitted.) The
application of laches, under these circumstances, incentivizes early resolution of election
law controversies, especially where, as here, the question is a simple claim respecting a
party’s residency, and means, in effect, that “’[t]he law imposes a duty on parties having
grievances . . . to bring their complaints forward for preelection adjudication.’” Id.
(Citations omitted.) If parties having adequate opportunities to raise the question at issue
do not come forward on a pre-election basis, “they will be barred from the equitable relief
of overturning the results of the election.” Id. (Citations omitted.)
This Court – echoing the rationales advanced in Soules – also applies the laches
doctrine to election contests. In Clegg v. Bennion, 247 P.2d 614 (Utah 1952), Clegg
asked for an extraordinary writ in order to disqualify Dalton who had won nomination as
the Republican candidate in a Utah congressional race. Clegg argued that Dalton had
made an untimely filing of his declaration of candidacy and, therefore, was ineligible for
office. The Court’s opinion acknowledges that the deadline for filing was mandatory,
and, moreover, that the Court’s own precedents on the subject had not allowed any
equitable circumstance, no matter how extenuating, to relax this mandate. The Court
nevertheless denied what may have been a meritorious application for a special writ and
refused relief to Clegg on the basis of laches.
The Court said: “[W]e feel that Mr. Clegg comes to us too late. Matters of import
as great as this require airing at the earliest opportunity and at a time when anticipated
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error may be prevented of occurrence. In this case any question of ineligibility or
disqualification existed, if at all, on July 12, 19 days before the convention to which the
declarants’ names were to be presented. During that period the matter could have been
litigated. Seeking relief 13 days after the convention had met, accepted and nominated
the declarants, impresses as not being within that reasonable time contemplated in equity
in such cases. It would seem rather to provoke an unfair assurance that . . . losing
candidates have two shafts to their bow, while disfranchising delegates to party
conventions which traditionally have enjoyed an autonomy usually unreviewable by the
courts.” Clegg v. Bennion, 247 P.2d at 616 (elisions added).
The Court’s opinion makes clear that Clegg’s tardiness, a delay of 13 days in
comparison to Laws’s procrastination of eight months, was unreasonable, in large
measure, because the convention delegates, party leaders, state election officials, and
Dalton himself, in effect were relying upon Clegg’s inaction by expending time, effort,
and resources in conducting their campaign for election.
In Peck v. Monson, 652 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1982), this Court affirmed an injunction
which the trial court entered against the Lieutenant Governor, ordering him to put
petitioner Peck on the general election ballot for a state legislative race. Peck had sued
the Lieutenant Governor, arguing that his denial of ballot placement was grounded upon
an erroneous reading of a timing provision in the elections code. The Utah Supreme
Court resolved the case by upholding Peck’s views on statutory construction, but Justice
Oaks filed a concurring opinion, id. at 1327-1328, which maintained that the trial judge
might have dismissed Peck’s petition on the basis of laches.
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Justice Oaks noted that Peck had five months to obtain a ruling which applied the
statute in question to the facts of his case but waited three months before bringing suit.
Although the courts took approximately one month to adjudicate the issues, the passage
of time, in Justice Oaks’s view, was entirely too disruptive and impaired the integrity of
the electoral process. He observed that, while the contest was pending, political parties
and the legislative candidates were left in limbo. Uncertain of the ballot, voters did not
know who their candidates would be and accordingly how to evaluate them. All
involved, including the state itself, which spends millions of dollars in funding elections,
were at risk of wasting their time, effort, and resources.
Justice Oaks cited the approach taken by Clegg as the antidote for these ills,
arguing, with Clegg, that petitioners have a legal duty to “put the controversy before the
courts ‘at the earliest opportunity[,]’” and quoting in full the same language from the
Clegg opinion which we have inserted above, emphasizing that disappointed candidates,
like Laws, should not be given “two shafts to their bow.” His opinion is significant
because, although a concurrence in Peck and dictum in relation to the outcome of that
case, it later was adopted as the view of this Court.
In In re Cook, 882 P.2d 656 (Utah 1994), this Court returned to the application of
laches in election contests. Petitioners were sponsors of an initiative under Chapter 7 of
Title 20A of the election code. They disagreed with determinations by the Lieutenant
Governor respecting the language to be used in describing their initiative on the ballot
and also in connection with the voter information pamphlet. A unanimous Court agreed
with the petitioners’ contentions, finding that the Lieutenant Governor was wrong and
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that the ballot title and information pamphlet, insofar as they concerned petitioners’
initiative, were in violation of the statute. Nevertheless, the Court overruled the
petitioners’ application for a special writ and denied any relief on the basis of laches.
Relying upon Justice Oaks’s concurring opinion in Peck v. Monson and its
supporting precedent of Clegg v. Bennion, the Court ruled that petitioners had slept on
their rights, because they were aware of the offensive language in the ballot title and the
information pamphlet on August 31, but waited nearly two months, until September 28,
to lodge their petition with the Court. In the meantime, the ballots and pamphlets had
been printed and partially distributed and some absentee ballots had been cast, possibly in
reliance on those materials. These circumstances underscored the need to require
petitioners to bring their election-related claims to the attention of the judiciary (citing the
same language from Clegg which Justice Oaks had relied upon in Peck) “at the earliest
possible opportunity.”
Laws manifestly did not satisfy his “legal duty” to bring the question of
Grayeyes’s residency to court “at the earliest possible opportunity.” Laws was not
ignorant of the dispute surrounding Grayeyes’s residency and his qualification as a
candidate. News surrounding the controversy – and related judicial proceedings – was
widespread. Even if he counted on Black and Nielson to carry water for his campaign in
Judge Nuffer’s court, that reliance was unreasonable, since it was apparent that these
federal proceedings would not adjudicate the state-law residency issue. In all events,
Laws knew, in early August, when Judge Nuffer ruled, that any such reliance was
misplaced.
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Laws’s delay was more than “unreasonable,” the typical yardstick by which the
application of laches is measured. As Grayeyes’s political opponent, Laws had more
reason than most to monitor the progress of the election and the ongoing debate
respecting Grayeyes’s residency and had no reason to leave leadership in that debate to
surrogates like Black or Nielson. He therefore should have led out, in March, with an
objection to the Grayeyes candidacy under §20A-9-202(5), especially because the
Grayeyes declaration of candidacy, with its affirmation of residency, by statutory edict,
remained valid throughout the election cycle in the absence of a timely objection – within
5 days of the last date on which declarations of candidacy could be filed -- pursuant to
§20A-9-202(5)(a).
At the very least, as a candidate who cared about winning, he should have taken
steps to use the other available election remedies noted above when it became apparent
that Grayeyes would pursue relief in federal court, posing the risk that the Black/Nielson
effort would not bear fruit, and he had even more incentive to take independent action
once it became apparent, in June and July 2018, that Nielson’s manipulation of the reframed voter registration dispute would backfire and lead to an injunction.
When Judge Nuffer struck a fatal blow to Laws’s campaign, by entering an
injunction on August 9, Laws had no further excuse for inaction. Even at that juncture,
although undoubtedly aware of all the events described above, and notwithstanding two
months remaining in the pre-election cycle -- ample time in light of the factual findings
and language employed in Clegg, Peck, Brown, and Cook -- Laws continued to bide his
time, lying in wait until he lost the election and darkness settled, believing that he still
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could use that extra “shaft in his bow,” so disparaged by the opinions cited above, in
order to gain victory. This Court, in those opinions, has refused to countenance this kind
of political gamesmanship and should now hold to that stance and dismiss Laws’s appeal
on the ground of untimeliness and laches.
JUDGE TORGERSON’S RULING THAT GRAYEYES HAS A PRINCIPAL
PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN SAN JUAN COUNTY SHOULD BE UPHELD ON
APPEAL
Laws’s complaint alleged that the 2018 election should be annulled because
Grayeyes, as the elected candidate, was not “eligible for the office [of commissioner] at
the time of the election[,]” §20A-4-402(1)(b), and, as the candidate declared elected, was
“ineligible to serve in the office to which [he had been] elected[,]” §20A-4-402(1)(g). To
make his case at trial, Laws relied upon the criterion for eligibility found in §17-161(1)(b), which provides that, when filing a declaration of candidacy, a candidate shall
have been “a resident for at least one year of the county . . . in which the person seeks
office[.]” ROA at 001907. Grayeyes filed his declaration of candidacy on March 9, 2018
(Trial Exhibit 11). The one-year period noted in this statute therefore ran from March 9,
2017, through March 9, 2018.8
After considering the evidentiary submissions at trial, Judge Torgerson determined
that Grayeyes “is a resident of San Juan County living at Navajo Mountain/Paiute Mesa.”

8

Every other statute respecting eligibility-requirements for county commissioners deals
with voter registration, not legal residency. See, §§17-16-1(1)(c), 17-53-202(1) and 1753-202(2). Grayeyes had been a registered voter in San Juan County for decades and,
therefore, satisfied all requirements under these statutes.
40 | P a g e

Appendix A at 2. He also had no problem “concluding that Grayeyes maintains his
principal place of residence in San Juan County.” Appendix A at 8. But Judge Torgerson
also indicated that, while Grayeyes “has always maintained his residence at Navajo
Mountain/Paiute Mesa,” he may not have a “primary house” in that location. Appendix
A at 2. Judge Torgerson was “not persuaded [by Laws’s] argument that a particular
house is required for a person to have a principal place of residence. As long as the
location where the person resides is entirely within a voting precinct, the Court believes
the ‘single location where a person’s habitation is fixed’ [as defined in §20A-2-105(1)(a)]
could mean a larger geographical area and include various places, particularly for
someone like Mr. Grayeyes who observes traditional cultural practices. He may stay on
Paiute Mesa under a shade hut during the summer. Or at his daughter’s cabin. Or at his
sister’s house in Navajo Mountain. As long as those all fall within a single voting
precinct, that geographical area is sufficient to be a principal place of residence.”
Appendix A at 8.
Laws’s principal brief, at pages 14-16, focuses on Judge Torgerson’s dictum that
the statutory definition for a “principal place of residence” in §20A-2-105(1)(a) may be
read broadly to cover voters who reside in a single precinct with a degree of fluidity to
their habitation. He argues that this reading of the statute was wrong as a matter of law,
requiring reversal.
We believe that Judge Torgerson correctly applied §20A-2-105(1)(a) to the
peculiar facts of our case, but this Court may sustain his Ruling and Order on appeal for
alternate reasons. E.g., Peak Alarm Company, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 2010
41 | P a g e

UT 22, ¶76 (appellate court may uphold decision of lower court on any legal basis);
Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ¶18 (same). These are as follows: Laws failed to
marshal the evidence pursuant to appellate requirements. Grayeyes qualifies for
residence in San Juan County under §17-16-1(1)(b), even if he may not satisfy the
specific standards of §20A-2-105(1)(a). If §20A-2-105 applies, Laws did not satisfy his
burden of proving an essential element of his case in chief under §§20A-2-105(7)(a),
20A-2-105(7)(b)(ii), and 20A-2-105(1)(a). Considering all factors under §20A-2-105(4),
Grayeyes has a principal place of residence at a fixed habitation in a single location at
Navajo Mountain/Paiute Mesa within the meaning of §20A-2-105(1)(a).
1. Laws’s appeal should be dismissed for failing properly to marshal the
evidence.
Laws attacks Judge Torgerson’s findings of fact supporting the lower court’s
rulings that Grayeyes had legal residency in San Juan County. But Laws fails properly –
as directed by precedents from Utah’s appellate courts -- to marshal the evidence in favor
of Grayeyes as the prevailing party.
To begin, Laws has a “heavy burden” in pursuing any challenge to the fact findings
of the lower court. Matter of Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). This is
true, in large measure, because appellate courts do not weigh the evidence de novo, and
“great deference is given to the trial court’s findings, especially when they are based on
an evaluation of conflicting live testimony.” The appellate standard of review is whether
the findings are clearly erroneous. Id.
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Accordingly, when a challenge is attempted, all evidence – “every scrap” -- in
support of the finding under review first must be assembled in an appellant’s opening
brief. That assemblage, moreover, must “correlate particular items of evidence with the
challenged findings.” Next the appellant – assuming the role of a “devil’s advocate” -must present that evidence in the light most favorable to the finding in question. Only
then may the appellant endeavor to pinpoint the “fatal flaw” in that evidence, a defect
which must be profound enough to convince the appellate court that the finding was
“clearly erroneous.” Harding v. Bell, 57 P.3d 1093, 1097 (Utah 2002); Neely v. Bennett,
51 P.3d 724, 727-728 (Utah Ct. App. 2002); West Valley City v. Majestic Inv., Co., 818
P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Judge Torgerson made approximately 12 findings which supported his rulings on
residency. Laws should have addressed each of these -– specifically and serially -- in the
manner described above. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, 164 P.3d 384, 390 (Utah 2007). Instead, he merely summarized the
testimony and evidence which came through 13 witnesses. This testimony and evidence
were not assembled in a comprehensive manner -- not presented in the light most
favorable to the rulings in question -- and not related – with particularity and sequentially
– to each of the lower court’s various findings. This is plain to see, not only from a
cursory look at Laws’s principal brief, at pages 22-30, but also by comparison with the
evidentiary review of the residency questions which may be found in our brief in the next
succeeding sections. Laws’s half-baked approach will not wash under Utah’s precedents.
Selective testimony and incomplete analysis violate the marshaling rule. State v. Maese,
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236 P.3d 155, 160-161 (Utah Ct. App. 2010). Simply listing some of the evidence does
not satisfy the marshaling requirement. Kimball v. Kimball, 217 P.3d 733, 743 (Utah
2009).
Where an appellant, like Laws, fails properly to marshal the evidence, the appellate
court may do one of two things. It has discretion to ignore the challenger’s arguments
which are based upon factual findings. This is because the Court is “strictly bound to
affirm the accuracy of the…factual findings in the absence of marshaling.” Martinez v.
Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 164 P.3d at 390. Or
where – as here -- it appears that an appellee has a compelling case, well-grounded in
evidentiary submissions to the lower court, the appeal may be dismissed. Neely v.
Bennett, 51 P.3d at 728 (summary affirmance of the trial court decision when appellant
fails to marshal the evidence). Accordingly, Grayeyes respectfully submits that the Court
summarily should affirm Judge Torgerson’s rulings on residency in light of Laws’s
failure properly to marshal the evidence on this appeal.
2.Grayeyes qualifies for residence under §17-16-1(1)(b), even if he may not
satisfy the specific standards of §20A-2-105(1)(a).
Judge Torgerson found, at a minimum, that Grayeyes had general residency in San
Juan County. This satisfies the residency requirement of §17-16-1(1)(b), the eligibility
statute upon which Laws relies in this case. This is the statute, again, which provides that,
when filing a declaration of candidacy, a candidate shall have been “a resident for at least
one year of the county . . . in which the person seeks office.”
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Section 17-16-1(1)(b) does not define residency in terms of a specific location or
fixed habitation for purposes of eligibility to be a county commissioner. Language about
specific locations and fixed habitations is found at §20A-2-105, but that statute cannot be
used to define residency under §17-16-1(1)(b), because §20A-2-105(2) says that §20A-2105 applies, as relevant here, only “when determining whether a person is a resident for
purposes of interpreting this title [20A],” not title 17 of the Utah Code. Indeed, Utah case
law holds that statutes like §20A-2-105, in our election code, especially in view of
provisions like subpart (2), quoted above, cannot be given cross-application in other titles
of the Utah Code. See, Pugh v. Draper City, 114 P.3d 546, 548-549 (Utah 2005)
(provision of title 20A endorsing “substantial compliance” standard for certain purposes
in election code does not apply to campaign disclosure requirement found in Title 10 for
cities).
Section 17-16-1(1)(b)’s failure to define residency in terms of a specific location
or fixed habitation for pre-election purposes is underscored by §17-16-1(2), which uses
§20A-2-105 as the litmus test by which post-election changes in residency are
determined. See, Sjostrom v. Bishop, 393 P.2d 472, 474 (Utah 1964) (discussing
importance of differences between pre-election and post-election circumstances).
Hence, under §17-16-1(1)(b), only a general residency must be present when filing
a pre-election declaration of candidacy. Under §17-16-1(2), however, once a candidate is
elected, a post-election test to demarcate residential change during tenure in office comes
into play. At that point in time, a test is needed to indicate the circumstances under which
a change in residency has occurred, and §20A-2-105, in subpart (5)(a), satisfies that need:
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the failure to “maintain residence” during a commissioner’s term only can occur when
that commissioner both “acts affirmatively to move from the state” and “has the intent to
remain in another state[.]” §20A-2-105(5)(a).
This distinction between tests to determine residency on a pre- or post-election
basis, not only makes sense because of obvious differences between candidates who run
for office and elected candidates who become officeholders, but also coordinates
perfectly with the remaining standards which establish eligibility for county
commissioners. All of these are based on voter registration, §§17-16-1(1)(c), 17-53202(1), and 17-53-202(2), which creates a presumption of residency within the precinct
where registration occurs, §20A-2-105(7)(a). That presumption may be rebutted only by
showing, as with elected commissioners under §17-16-1(2), that the voter, after
registration, has moved and established a new principal place of residence out of state,
§§20A-2-105(5)(a) and 20A-2-105(7)(b)(i).
In short, the Utah legislature apparently knew what it was doing when
distinguishing between pre- and post-election residency requirements for county
commissioners and carefully crafted the relevant statutes to achieve its policy goals.
Hence, in light of §17-16-1(1)(b)’s general residency standard, Judge Torgerson’s dictum
that Grayeyes lived in San Juan County – albeit with some fluidity to his stopping places
-- during the pre-election period is sufficient, without more, to defeat Laws’s complaint.
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3. If §20A-2-105 applies, Laws failed to prove a basic element of his case-inchief as required under §§20A-2-105(7)(a), 20A-2-105(7)(b)(ii), and 20A-2-105(1)(a).
Judge Torgerson ruled that Laws did not prove that Grayeyes had a principal
place of residence, within the meaning of §20A-2-105(1)(a), at a mobile home in Page,
Arizona. Ruling and Order at 7. This finding alone also is sufficient to defeat Laws’s
complaint.
Laws had to prove that Grayeyes did not reside in San Juan County from March 9,
2017, through March 9, 2018. §17-16-1(1)(b). Laws insists that §20A-2-105 governs
determinations of residency in this case, while admitting that Grayeyes was a registered
voter in San Juan County during that same period. What does this combination of
circumstances mean under our election code?
Registered voters are presumed to have a principal place of residence in their
registration precinct. §20A-2-105(7)(a). This presumption may be rebutted only through
a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the voter has a “principal place of
residence” outside of Utah. §20A-2-105(7)(b)(ii).
Laws attempted to rebut this presumption and make this showing by offering into
evidence the title records for a mobile home in Page, Arizona, which Grayeyes had
purchased in 1984. However, Laws offered no evidence whatsoever that this was a
property at which Grayeyes had ever lived on a sustained basis or to which he had any
“intention to return” within the meaning of §§20A-2-105(7)(b)(ii) and 20A-2-105(1)(a).
A short field trip to the Arizona mobile home would have shown Laws that the structure
was uninhabitable, an abandoned ruin. Evidence just as easily accessed would have
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revealed that this property had been in a state of dereliction for some time. Moreover, far
from harboring any intention of “returning,” Grayeyes had not set foot on this property
for over 30 years. ROA at 002202ff and 002234ff.
More than this, it is indisputable that Grayeyes has been a registered voter – and
has voted -- in San Juan County for decades. The Lieutenant Governor, as chief elections
officer for the state of Utah, certified Grayeyes as a lawful candidate for county
commissioner in 2012. The San Juan County Clerk, as local elections officer, had
renewed Grayeyes’s registration to vote in 2016. Trial Exhibit 13.
Before Judge Torgerson and, to some extent, in his principal brief in this Court,
Laws endeavors to talk around these facts by insisting that Grayeyes did not live in San
Juan County. But this is a red herring. Because he is a registered voter in San Juan
County, Grayeyes is presumed to live there. To rebut this presumption, under the clear
language of the controlling statutes, Laws has to show that Grayeyes has a principal place
of residence in another state. Laws tried to show that the trailer in Page met that mark,
but the evidence – especially evidence concerning the relevant period from March 2017
to March 2018 -- overwhelmingly was against him and Judge Torgerson so ruled. That
ruling was based upon uncontroverted facts and conclusively establishes, on this alternate
theory of the case, that Laws’s complaint properly was dismissed.
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4. Considering all factors under §20A-2-105(4), Grayeyes has a principal place
of residence at a fixed habitation in a single location on Navajo Mountain/Paiute
Mesa.
In his principal brief, Laws argues, at pages 14-16, that Judge Torgerson erred by
finding that Grayeyes resided generally in San Juan County as opposed to a fixed
habitation in single location at Navajo Mountain. As demonstrated above, this argument
is a blind, because, as a registered voter, Grayeyes was presumed to have a principal
place of residence, a fixed habitation in a single location, at Navajo Mountain, and Laws
could rebut this presumption only by showing that this legal residency at Navajo
Mountain had been replaced by a principal place of residence in a state other than Utah –
something he failed to do. Nevertheless, the evidence at trial overwhelmingly supports a
conclusion that Grayeyes had a principal place of residence at Navajo Mountain within
the meaning of §§20A-2-105(1)(a) and 20A-2-105(4).
Residency under §20A-2-105(a)(1) is largely about a person’s “intention to return”
to a certain location. Section 20A-2-105(4) asks judges to consider nine factors, listed,
(a) through (i), “to the extent that . . . [he] determines the factors to be relevant” in
evaluating this question of “intent.” An evaluation of these key factors supports the
finding of Grayeyes’s residence at Navajo Mountain.
a. Voter registration and voting.
Section 20A-2-105(4) does not specifically name voter registration and actual
voting as factors to be considered in determining residency. But subpart (i) of that statute
is a catch-all provision that requires a judge to look at all other relevant, residency-related
49 | P a g e

circumstances. Registering to vote and voting are relevant, arguably even determinative,
in this case for important reasons.
The statutory provisions for determining eligibility to run for and serve in the
office of commissioner -- found in §§17-16-1(1) and 17-53-202 – stipulate voter
registration as a requirement three times and actual residency only once. And residency is
presumed from registration and voting, as a matter of statutory direction, §20A-2105(7)(a), and long-standing judicial precedent, e.g., Beauregaard v. Gunnison City, 160
P. 815, 818-819 (Utah 1916) (voter is presumed to reside in place where he last voted).
How did proof at trial speak to these points of law? Through counsel, Laws
himself introduced Trial Exhibit 13 which was received into evidence. ROA at 001976
and 001978. This exhibit shows, among other facts, that Grayeyes has been a registered
voter in San Juan County since the age of 18, that he has voted in almost all San Juan
County elections since 2000, that he was certified by the Lieutenant Governor for the
State of Utah to stand as a candidate for the office of commissioner in San Juan County
in the 2012 general election, and that he never has voted in any state other than Utah.
Confirming this testimony, the Court received into evidence – without objection from
Laws – Trial Exhibit 25, ROA at 002242-002243, the voter registration and voting
records for Grayeyes in San Juan County.
Trial Exhibit 13 and testimony from Lena Fowler, a government official in
Coconino County, further demonstrated that Grayeyes never had registered to vote or
actually voted in Arizona where Laws alleged that Grayeyes lived. ROA at 002126002127. This circumstance has relevance under §20A-2-105(4)(i) because registration
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and voting in another state may be a determinant of residency in light of §20A-2105(3)(e)(ii).
But the absence of registration and voting in Arizona has significance beyond the
negative inference to be drawn from §20A-2-105(3)(e)(ii). It also suggests that, because
Grayeyes did not register to vote in Arizona, he had no intent to stay permanently in that
state. See, Op. Az. Atty. Gen., No. 72-37-L (act of registration shows independent intent
to remain permanently for residency purposes in Arizona). It likewise indicates that
Grayeyes may not have qualified to become a resident there for any electoral purpose on
account of insufficient contacts. See, Parker v. City of Tucson, 314 P.3d 100, 108-109
(Ariz. 2013) (physical presence in Arizona isn’t enough to qualify for residency). Indeed,
since he was registered to vote in Utah, Grayeyes could not obtain residency, for voting
purposes, in the state of Arizona. See, A.R.S. §16-101.
b. Family residences and sleeping arrangements.
The proximity of family is another criterion for determining residency. Thus,
§20A-2-105(4), at subparts (a) and (d), invites consideration of where a “person’s family
resides” and “where a person usually sleeps.” Trial testimony showed that Grayeyes has a
traditional homestead on Paiute Mesa, Navajo Mountain, San Juan County. Two sons
live there, and it is the place his family gathers for celebratory occasions. ROA at
002222. Grayeyes has a daughter and a sister who live at Navajo Mountain and he stays
as much as 80 percent of each year at their homes. ROA at 002212- 002213, 002240002241, and 002226-002232. Laws’s own witness, Alex Bitsinnie, affirmed that “most
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everyone” who lives at Navajo Mountain, was a Grayeyes relative, and that it would take
“the rest of the day, tomorrow,” to name them all. ROA at 002090 and 002089.
c. Occupational/business pursuits.
Section 20A-2-105(4), at subpart (f), identifies “employment, income sources, or
business pursuits” as factors to be considered in determining residency. Laws put Trial
Exhibit 13 into evidence, paragraphs 14, 15, and 16 of which show that Grayeyes was a
Chapter Official and Secretary/Treasurer of the Navajo Mountain Chapter of the Navajo
Nation and the chairperson of the local school board. Five other witnesses, Alex
Bitsinnie, Herman Daniels, Lena Fowler, April Wilkerson, and Naverina Grayeyes,
supplied testimony which proved that, in performing this work, Grayeyes has been
physically present and actively engaged with the Navajo Mountain community for many
years. ROA at 002071, 002073, 002084-002087, 002155-002158, 002125, 002212002213, 002240, 002236, 002129-002130, and 002133. In fact, according to Fowler,
Grayeyes was known in her community as “Mr. Utah,” because his work was so central
to San Juan County in general and Navajo Mountain in particular. ROA at 002136.
Grayeyes also runs cattle at his homestead on Navajo Mountain. A permit from
the grazing committee at the Navajo Nation is necessary to conduct this business. The
agent for that committee, Russell Smallcanyon, testified that Grayeyes had such a permit,
ROA at 002194, and that his cattle operation was inspected and in compliance with the
Nation’s regulations, ROA at 002198-002199. Registration of Grayeyes’s cattle brand
with the State of Utah apparently is a necessary aspect of these compliance audits. ROA
at 002200. Mr. Bitsinnie, Laws’s witness, testified that, over the past three to four years,
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he had seen Grayeyes in attendance at grazing committee meetings at Navajo Mountain.
ROA at 002083. In addition, Grayeyes’s daughter, April, testified that her father’s stops
with his sister, Rose, in Navajo Mountain, were for the purpose of looking in on the
cattle, ROA at 002212, and that the family gathered on occasion at the Grayeyes
homestead to brand the cows and help with operation of the livestock, ROA at 002222.
Other witnesses testified about the significant relationship between the ownership
of cattle and the location of a home in the Navajo tradition. ROA at 002149-002151,
002138, 002179-002180, and 002160. Judge Torgerson was authorized, pursuant to
§20A-2-105(4)(i), to take this evidence into account so long as he deemed it to be
relevant. And the evidence has relevance because it speaks to the residence-related
intentions of Grayeyes, who, as a Navajo, is a product of these bedrock Navajo cultural
beliefs.
But this point may be mooted because the trial evidence, taken as a whole, showed
that the connection at Navajo Mountain between animal husbandry and living space is
not merely a sociological metaphor. In addition to the evidence noted above, Lena
Fowler testified that the grazing committee, along with Chapter officials, manages affairs
at Navajo Mountain. ROA at 002125. And another witness, Russell Smallcanyon,
affirmed that ownership of a grazing permit is critical to the acquisition of a homesite
lease at Navajo Mountain. ROA at 002198. This, in turn, was corroborated by Laws’s
witness, Mr. Bitsinnie, who said that the grazing committee is responsible for homesite
leasing. ROA at 002082. The fact that Grayeyes held a grazing permit, in other words,
showed entitlement to his actual home and his family’s homestead at Navajo Mountain.
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d. Real property.
Laws’s case focused primarily upon §20A-2-105(4)(g), which asks courts to
consider the location of real property owned by a person whose residency is under
review. Laws showed, through official records, that in the early 1980s Grayeyes and his
wife purchased a mobile home in Page, Arizona. Those records also suggested that,
approximately 18 years ago, a refinancing in relation to that property had occurred, and
that property tax notices – with the words “principal residence” – had been addressed to
Grayeyes and mailed to a post office box.
But the ownership of realty, standing alone, does not tell us much of anything in
relation to a person’s residency. Many folks, politicians and voters alike, have multiple
homes in as many locations. And the statute itself, for example, §§20A-2-105(1)(a), 3(c),
and 3(e), is peppered with language which contemplates this very contingency. This also
is why subpart (4) of §20A-2-105 identifies 9 indicators – one of which is a catch-all
provision for all other relevant factors – additional to realty ownership – as signposts on
the road to determine residency. Accordingly, in these instances, there must be a
showing, some sort of narrative context, that “ownership” of one property, rather than
another, signifies residency, and the prefatory language in §20A-2-105(4), calling our
attention to the “relevancy” of a property’s location, is a reminder of this need.
But Laws’s sole evidence respecting the mobile home consisted of official
records; he called no witness who could explain the relevant circumstances –
circumstances, if any, which might bear upon the question of residency -- behind
Grayeyes’s naked title to that property. As real property lawyers know, title may be the
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least important twig in the bundle of sticks which comprise “ownership” of land. And,
more to the point in this case, naked title deals only with nominal – or apparent -ownership -- whereas residency is concerned with a person’s more “enduring ties” 9 -including homestead traditions, closeness of kin, or actual occupancy of a particular place
-- by the individual in question.
Laws’s evidence not only suffered from this lack of explanatory context, but also
could not be given much weight in our case -- because the dates on which the mobile
home was purchased (nearly four decades ago) and refinanced (almost two decades past)
are exceedingly remote in relation to the 2018 election cycle, the relevant time-line for
determining residency in this election contest.
Grayeyes’s evidence nevertheless filled the holes left in Laws’s case -- with
information which proved that the mobile home had no relation to the question of
residency under §20A-2-105(4). Grayeyes’s daughters explained that Grayeyes did not
live in the mobile home for most of the 1980s, as well as all of the 1990s and the 21 st
century. Grayeyes and his wife acquired the mobile home so that the wife could
supervise the children while they attended school during their early years in that location
(because there were no schools at that time on the Utah side of the Navajo Reservation at
Navajo Mountain). ROA at 002235. Grayeyes could not stay at the mobile home because
he worked elsewhere. ROA at 002236 and 002206-002207. His wife and children paid

9

This phrase is drawn from Dodge v. Evans, 716 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah 1985), an
important decision by this Court on the question of residency for political purposes.
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him visits in their home at Navajo Mountain – on account of Grayeyes’s work obligations
in that community -- during break-times or vacation intervals. ROA at 002237 and
002206-002207. Grayeyes, for a short period after his wife died, in 1987 and 1988,
looked after his children in Page while they continued their education, but even this
short-lived parental supervision often was interrupted when Grayeyes returned to his
primary residence at Navajo Mountain, ROA at 002237-002238, and ended when the
oldest daughter, upon turning 18, could give full-time attention to the remaining
youngsters, ROA at 002207-002208. Grayeyes’s children have been the sole occupants
of the mobile home since 1988 because Grayeyes himself continued working as a
Chapter official at Navajo Mountain. ROA at 002238-002239 and 002226-002232. The
last child to occupy the mobile home, a son, left in the middle of the 2010s, after which
the structure became uninhabitable and accordingly was boarded up and abandoned.
ROA at 002210-002211. The tax notices for the property, although bearing Grayeyes’s
name, were mailed to post office boxes which were registered to his children, and his
children, not Grayeyes, paid those taxes. ROA at 002210-002211. 10 Insofar as the mobile
home is concerned, Grayeyes has been nothing more than a title holder, certainly not an

10

Laws argued that the tax notices, which carried the designation “principal residence” in
lower case type, proved that this was Grayeyes’s “principal place of residence” under
Utah’s election code. But Laws did not lay any foundation for this assertion. He did not
call a witness with personal knowledge of what this hearsay designation means on an
Arizona tax notice. And A.R.S. §§42-12052, 12053, and 12010, suggest, as one might
expect, that this label is part of a classification system which facilitates the use of variable
rates on different properties under Arizona law for tax purposes. Accordingly, it has little
or no “relevance” to the question of residency under Utah law for election purposes.
56 | P a g e

actual occupant, ROA at 002221, and, indeed, has not set foot on the Page property since
1989, almost 30 years ago. ROA at 002210, 002202ff, and 002234ff.
Grayeyes’s principal place of residence, the place which he intended permanently
to call home and the place to which, even when absent temporarily for work, he always
intends to return, is at Navajo Mountain. The testimony to this effect – especially from
his daughters -- was compelling and conclusive. ROA at 002202ff and 002234ff.
This place is a birthright, where his umbilical cord was buried in a sacred
ceremony. Trial Exhibit 14. The importance of this circumstance, as a signifier of
“residency,” cannot be overstated. The umbilical cord ritual, as a symbol of homestead
ownership, has been recognized specifically in Tenth Circuit case law, see, United States
v. Tsosie, 849 F. Supp. 768, 774-775 (D. N. M. 1994). At least four witnesses, including
Mr. Bitsinnie who Laws called to the stand, testified to this effect. ROA at 002081002082 and 002090 and 002091, 002145-002149, 002174-002178, and 002121-002122.
Johnson Dennison, an expert witness, said that this ceremony tells us where a Navajo
“lives;” it says that, no matter where I go, “I always come back to the place where my
umbilical cord is buried.” In a similar vein, as noted above, Grayeyes ran cattle at this
location, another index to homestead location in Navajo tradition.
Grayeyes presented evidence respecting the importance of these circumstances as
determinants of “home” – and Judge Torgerson took them into account -- not as Laws
contends in his principal brief because Navajo custom somehow takes precedence over
the Utah statute which defines residency under the election code -- but because these
circumstances prove an “intention” within the meaning of that statute and code -- to
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maintain Navajo Mountain as a principal place of residence and always to return there,
even when absent on an interim basis. Intention, in this regard, is the very touchstone of
residency under Utah election law. §§20A-2-105(3)(a)(ii), (1)(a).
Even if we eliminate all evidence respecting Navajo traditions and Grayeyes’s
beliefs, Navajo Mountain, in every secular sense, was Grayeyes’s principal place of
residence. As shown above, he registered to vote and in fact voted there for over 30
years. Likewise, as shown above, his income was derived from occupations at that
location throughout this same extended period. Similarly, as shown above, most of his
immediate family and numerous kin from an extended clan shared space with him at
Navajo Mountain. A majority of witnesses who had acquaintance with Grayeyes -- his
daughters, workmates, and friends -- all testified that they either knew Grayeyes in fact
resided at Navajo Mountain or had visited his homestead there or both. ROA at
002202ff, 002234ff, 002129-002130 and 002133, 002180-002184 and 002158. One of
these witnesses knew that Grayeyes had a residence at Navajo Mountain, not only
because he personally had visited the place, but also because, in official work for the
Navajo Nation, he saw that the Grayeyes home was scheduled for infrastructure
improvements, including installation of water lines and a septic tank. ROA at 002163002167.
In short, Laws may have thought that he could write a “tale of two houses,” but, at
the end of trial, there was little sound, no fury, and his story signified nothing. He
produced certified copies of official records showing that Grayeyes had purchased a
Page-based mobile home in the early 1980s – and nothing more. The truly relevant
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evidence showed that this mobile home was a temporary expedient where his wife could
tend to the education of their children. Grayeyes was the title holder, and even early on,
only rarely, the occupant of that home. ROA at 002221. It has been beneficially owned
by his children – who have paid taxes on the land -- for decades. Grayeyes has not spent
time in the trailer for nearly 30 years. ROA at 002210. It is far removed from the 2018
election cycle with which this case is concerned.
In contrast, Grayeyes’s homestead at Navajo Mountain is a principal place of
residence. All of his “enduring ties,” religious, familial, political, social, and economic,
are there. Family members, nuclear and extended, live nearby. The local community
looks to him for leadership, as Chapter official, school board chair, and advocate for
environmental needs, educational facilities, and social services. He has been a registered
voter – voting in elections – for over 30 years. He ran for the office of commissioner in
the 2012 election. This is where he has earned a living and runs his cattle. And, as the
evidence at trial repeatedly showed, this is the place to which Grayeyes always has
returned and continues to return.
In summary, §20A-2-105(4) lists nine factors which, to the extent relevant in a
given case, might be indicative of residency. A fair-minded and even-handed application
of five of the nine factors, realty ownership, family residences, sleeping arrangements,
work-related pursuits, and voter registration and voting (as otherwise relevant under
subpart (i)), to the facts of this case demonstrates that Grayeyes has a principal place of
residence in Navajo Mountain, San Juan County. Many of these factors, the Navajo
Mountain homestead, cattle ownership, family ties, and work connections, have been
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identified as major indices to a finding of residency by this Court. See, Dodge v. Evans,
716 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah 1985). Three of the nine, marital status, age, and where minor
children are going to school, have no bearing on Grayeyes’s residency for purposes of the
2018 election cycle.
5. Portions of the Turk Report properly were excluded and that exclusion was
harmless.
Judge Torgerson excluded portions of a report prepared by San Juan County
Deputy Sheriff Colby Turk which purported to be the product of an investigation into
Grayeyes’s residency on Navajo Mountain. 11 Laws argues that Judge Torgerson abused
his discretion in excluding portions of the report (the disallowed portions of which
hereafter will be called “the Report”) – because the Report was admissible under Utah R.
Evid. 803(8), the public records exception to the rule against hearsay.
Judge Torgerson, however, did not abuse his discretion for the following reasons:
The Report properly was excluded for insufficient foundation. The Report, if made
pursuant to a criminal case was inadmissible under the plain terms of Rule 803(8)(A)(ii),
and, if part of a civil proceeding, was not the product of a “legally authorized
investigation” within the meaning of Rule 803(8)(A)(iii). In addition, the Report did not
contain “factual findings” and therefore did not qualify for admissibility under Rule

11

It is important to note that Judge Torgerson did not exclude the entire report. He
disallowed Turk’s narration respecting encounters with witnesses, videos taken of those
interviews, and transcriptions of those interrogations. He allowed Turk’s testimony of
what he saw, along with documents, such as photographs, which Turk himself took on his
journey to Navajo Mountain. He also allowed a videotape (but not the transcription) of
Turk’s interview with Grayeyes and Grayeyes’s sister, Rose.
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803(8)(A)(iii). Finally, the Report lacked “trustworthiness” in light of its “sources of
information” and “other circumstances” and, therefore, in all events, was excludable
under Rule 803(8)(B).
a. Insufficient foundation.
Rule 803(8) provides that a “record or statement of a public office” may be
admitted, notwithstanding the rule against hearsay, if “it sets out: (8)(A)(i) the office’s
activities; (8)(A)(ii) a matter observed while under a legal duty to report, but not
including, in a criminal case, a matter observed by law-enforcement personnel; or
(8)(A)(iii) in a civil case . . . factual findings from a legally authorized investigation; and
(8)(B) neither the source of information nor other circumstances indicate a lack of
trustworthiness.”
Laws didn’t call a witness who had the personal knowledge necessary to lay
foundation for admission of the Report under Rule 803(8). E.g., State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d
1181, 1184 (Utah 1983) (“a proper foundation must be laid to establish the necessary
indicia of reliability”). He called Deputy Turk who, insofar as “legal authorization” for
the Grayeyes investigation was concerned, gave only hearsay accounts about a complaint
from Wendy Black (concerning Grayeyes’s status as a candidate or voter under Utah
election law) to the County Clerk who called the County Sheriff, but no accounting
whatsoever for the legal basis which justified the Sheriff’s department or Turk personally
to conduct an investigation involving two citizens in a civil proceeding. ROA at 001924001926 and 001933-001935.
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Following up on the Black complaint, Turk did footwork in the field, and,
therefore, could report on geography covered and witnesses interviewed, but he lacked
any personal knowledge whether these “sources of information” -- some of whom were
unnamed in the Report -- and the opinions which they expressed had validity in fact.
E.g., State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1184 (under prior version of Rule 803(8), foundation for
admissibility must show that “the sources of information” used in report and
“circumstances of the preparation of the document” were indicative of “trustworthiness[
]”); Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413, 416-417 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (breathalyzer test
result properly excluded in civil administrative proceeding for want of foundation
testimony from qualified operator; police affidavit properly excluded for want of
foundational testimony showing reliability). Cf. Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 85
P.2d 819, 823 (Utah 1938) (under common law rule, physician’s report respecting nurse
involvement in appendix removal properly excluded where no foundation laid concerning
reasons why nurse was unavailable to testify).
Indeed, since Turk did not claim to be the custodian of records in the sheriff’s
office, he gave no testimony respecting the safekeeping of the Report and whether, from
March, 2018, when it was prepared, until January 22, 2019, the date on which it was
offered into evidence at trial, anyone had tampered with the videos or mishandled the
documentation. And no foundation, from either Turk or a court reporter, was laid to
explain the process for preparing the video transcriptions, critical testimony since these
recordings, at points, are inaudible and, on occasion, show witnesses speaking in Navajo.
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E.g., State v. Bertul, 665 P.2d at 1184 (“foundation must show that report, after being
prepared and filed, was kept “under circumstances that would preserve its integrity[ ]”).
b. If part of a criminal case, the Report had to be excluded; if part of a civil
proceeding, it properly was excluded because Turk’s investigation wasn’t legally
authorized.
To qualify for admissibility under Rule 803(8)(A)(ii), if the proffered report is part
of a criminal case, matters observed by law-enforcement personnel – notwithstanding a
legal duty to report -- may not come into evidence. In the alternative, under Rule
803(8)(A)(iii), if the proffered report is part of a civil case, its “factual findings” may be
admitted so long as the report is the end-result of a “legally authorized investigation.”
Notwithstanding some ambivalence on the part of Laws’s counsel, ROA at
001919-001920, it is clear that the Report was prepared in conjunction with a criminal
case. The Report, on its face, contemplates a criminal investigation. It gives an offense
code, “FIPO,” and states the nature of the offense as “False Info,” and as “FIPO False
Information or Report,” presumably an allegedly false oath which Grayeyes had made
about his residency when filing the declaration of candidacy. Turk also lacked authority
to conduct an investigation (as he did) on the Navajo Reservation, unless that endeavor
was part of a criminal case. Trial Exhibit 19.
In that event, however, Turk’s observations as a law-enforcement officer were
obviously inadmissible in view of the plain language of Rule 803(8)(A)(ii) and the
persuasive reasoning of this Court in State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1184-1185. Rule
803(8)(A)(ii)’s blanket exclusion of law-enforcement reports appears to be a codification
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of this reasoning in Bertul, and has been applied in later Utah cases. E.g., State v.
Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 298 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (police report not eligible for admission
under Rule); Layton City v. Peronek, 803 P.2d 1294, 1298 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (police
reports are not reliable enough to obtain admission under exception to rule against
hearsay). The Report, then, rightly was excluded pursuant to Rule 803(8)(A)(ii). 12
In the alternative, Laws may have believed that the Report was admissible as part
of a “legally authorized investigation” in a civil matter under Rule 803(8)(A)(iii). But
Judge Torgerson also had sufficient reason to exclude the Report under this subpart of the
Rule. As already noted, Laws laid no foundation that the Report was the product of a
“legally authorized investigation.” And Judge Nuffer of the United States District Court
for the District of Utah previously had found that the Report, far from being lawful, in
fact was used to violate Grayeyes’s rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. See, Grayeyes, et al. v. Cox, et al.,
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting [13] Plaintiff Grayeyes’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, civ. no. 4:18-cv-0004, Dkt. no. 94 (United States District Court

12

Laws’s principal brief on appeal, at pages 36-37, relies entirely on Rule 803(8)(A)(ii),
and not the alternative in Rule 803(8)(A)(iii). But his brief, at the top of page 37, quotes
the Rule misleadingly, by cutting off the critical part which supplies the exception to the
exception – “but not including, in a criminal case, a matter observed by law-enforcement
personnel[.]” As noted in our argument above, this part of the Rule, codifying Bertul,
when applicable, interdicts the use of law enforcement reports altogether as exceptions to
the hearsay rule. However, to remove all doubt on this subject, we discuss both
alternatives, criminal and civil, under Rule 803(8), showing that the Report was not
admissible under either.
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for the District of Utah, August 9, 2018). The Memorandum Decision found expressly
that the Turk investigation was “not permitted or authorized by statute.” Id. at 15-16.
c. No factual findings.
The Report failed to qualify for admissibility under Rule 803(8)(A)(iii), not only
because it was ultra vires, but also because, in any case, it contained no “factual
findings.” These findings give official reports the credibility and reliability needed to
become exceptions to the rule against hearsay. They are formalized when “data gathered
through the investigation is subjected to sifting and evaluation. Training, experience, and
intuition are applied to the compilation of raw data, and a report emerges. Facts are
found.” State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26, ¶20. The Report here is like the “raw data” noted in
Ison. The Report itself doesn’t purport to make factual findings; it merely contains an
“Investigation Narrative” in which Turk discusses where he went, with whom he spoke,
and what they said. These aren’t the factual findings contemplated by Rule
803(8)(A)(iii). See generally, State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26, ¶¶19-23.
d. Lacking trustworthiness.
Public reports are exceptions to the rule against hearsay because the officials who
prepare them generally are well-acquainted with the requirements of their work and
proficient in the performance of it. E.g., State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26, ¶20 (“[t]raining,
experience, and intuition”). But no foundation was laid showing that Turk had any
familiarity with civil disputes in general or voting rights in particular. His questioning of
witnesses in fact demonstrated a lack of understanding in this regard. Rather than
exploring the full range of relevant factors which serve to define residency under the
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election code, he merely asked whether Grayeyes “lives” – without giving a relevant time
frame, such as the March 2017-March 2018 election cycle -- at Navajo Mountain. E.g.,
State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1185 (reports may be prejudicial through “manner of
language usage[ ]”).
Worse than this, there was no science to the serendipity by which Turk selected
his witnesses or whether the few in his sample were representative of the general
population at that location. The Report shows that he did not ask questions to determine
whether his witnesses had first-hand knowledge which backed the assertions they gave on
tape. In addition to the double-hearsay implicit in such assertions, the Report contains
actual instances of several witnesses who claimed knowledge through statements from
others. Many witnesses were unnamed, entirely anonymous. Utah opinions emphasize
that such circumstances almost always will render a report inadmissible on the ground of
untrustworthiness. E.g., State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1184 and 1186 (witness statements
“are not made in the regular course of the witness’ business and do not have the indicia of
reliability” deemed necessary for admission as evidence; “investigatory reports of
government officials containing opinions not based on first-hand knowledge are not
admissible under [exception to rule against hearsay]”); State in Interest of W.S., 939 P.2d
196, 201 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (double hearsay “inherently unreliable” and has “a high
probability for inaccuracy”); Layton City v. Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1298 (officer twiceremoved in the organizational chain from jailer who witnessed violation cannot lay
foundation for admission of jailer’s report).
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e. Fundamental rights and harmless error.
Two final reasons support Judge Torgerson’s decision to exclude the Report.
First, voting is a fundamental right and the evidence presented to defeat this franchise
should be compelling, not questionable. Utah’s cases, treating evidentiary issues under
Rule 803(8) and its predecessor, have underscored this concern. See, State v. Bertul, 664
P.2d at 1185 (must apply exceptions to rule against hearsay so as to protect “substantial
rights” such as right to cross-examine under the Confrontation Clause in criminal cases);
Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d at 416 (same respecting right to travel, privilege of
driving, due process of law). Second, the presumption of residency tied to voter
registration may be rebutted – and the right to vote may be defeated – only by clear and
convincing evidence. See §§20A-3-202.3 and 20A-2-105(7)(b)(i). Hearsay, especially
the double hearsay and anonymous sources found in the Report, never can be clear and
convincing.
Even if a case could be made that Judge Torgerson had abused his discretion in
excluding the Report, that exclusion did no harm to Laws’s case. E.g., Utah R. Civ. Pro.
61; Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latter Day Saints Hospital, 318 P.2d at 333 (errors which do
not have a substantial effect upon the outcome of a trial are deemed harmless and do not
warrant reversal); Ha v. Trang, 380 P.3d 337, 340 (Utah Ct. App. 2016) (appellant has
burden of showing not only that an error occurred, but also that it was substantial and
prejudicial). As shown above, Laws had to prove, as an essential element of his case-inchief, that Grayeyes had a principal place of residence outside Utah. To prove this point,
Laws argued that Grayeyes’s principal place of residence was a mobile home in Page,
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Arizona. But the Report shows that Turk did not go to Page in furtherance of his
investigation, and, indeed, Page is mentioned, in passing, only once in that document.
Moreover, to make his case for the trailer in Page, Laws had to show that this was the
residence, a fixed habitation in a single location to which Grayeyes always intended to
return. The Report focuses on Tuba City, where Grayeyes has a girlfriend, but also
references other places inside Arizona – in other words, multiple stopping points and not
a single location – where Grayeyes, for a variety of reasons, stayed from time to time.
Hence, the Report doesn’t help with Laws’s case-in-chief and hurts that case by
deflecting attention from Page to multiple, rather than single, locations. In short, Laws
has not shown – and cannot show – that exclusion of the Report was a substantial error
and prejudicial to his case. The error, if any, therefore, was harmless.
JUDGE TORGERSON ERRED IN HIS DENIAL OF FEES AND COSTS 13
When he denied Grayeyes’s application for attorney fees and court costs, Judge
Torgerson overlooked the judicial branch’s inherent, exclusive power in relation to fee
awards, power which does not brook legislative interference. He, therefore, incorrectly
applied §78B-5-825, rather than equitable principles, to determine whether fees should be
awarded on the basis of bad faith. And he also incorrectly followed §78B-5-825.5,
instead of focusing on the equitable circumstances supporting application of the private

13

Grayeyes raised the question of fees and the constitutionality of legislative enactments
which impose upon judicial power to award them in the ROA at 001704ff and 002282ff.
Proper application of constitutional standards to the statutes in question presents a legal
question which is reviewed for correctness. E.g., Injured Workers Association of Utah v.
State, 2016 UT 21, ¶12.
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attorney general doctrine. Judge Torgerson’s ruling should be reversed and remanded so
that, after discovery, an evidentiary hearing, and application of the correct legal
standards, a determination respecting the propriety of fees and costs may be had.
1. The judicial power to regulate fees is inherent and exclusive; it overrides any
conflicting legislation.
Utah’s courts have inherent and exclusive authority to regulate the allowance and
allocation of attorney fees. See, Injured Workers Association of Utah v. State, 2016 UT
21. In Injured Workers, this Court struck down, as unconstitutional, legislation
empowering the Utah Labor Commission to determine fee allowances in workers’
compensation cases, as well as the agency rule implementing that statute. The Court
justified this ruling with three primary, logically sequential reasons. First, the judicial
branch has inherent power to regulate attorney fees under Art. VIII, §1. Second, since
attorney fees are an integral part of the practice of law, this historical, inherent power
over fee regulation was made exclusive and non-delegable by virtue of the 1985 revisions
to Art. VIII, §4. Third, in view of the exclusivity aspect of these 1985 revisions,
legislative enactments and administrative rules which interfere with judicial supremacy in
the subject area of fees are no longer legally enforceable because of Art. V. See, Injured
Workers Association of Utah v. State, 2016 UT 21, ¶¶3, 14-15.
The Court explained that prior precedents, such as Thatcher v. Industrial
Commission, 207 P.2d 178 (Utah 1949), and Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 133 P.2d 325 (Utah
1943), insofar as they may have created space for legislative edicts in relation to attorney
fees, had been overtaken by history and especially the 1985 revisions to Art. VIII. This
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process began in 1981, when the Court exercised its inherent power to integrate the Utah
State Bar and the practice of law, and was consummated through the 1985 ratification of
amendments to Art. VIII, which made judicial control over the legal profession and
dispensation of fees “explicit and exclusive.”

Injured Workers Association of Utah v.

State, 2016 UT 21, ¶¶3, 13-14, and 17-34, esp. ¶21 (“[t]his sharing of our power [with the
legislature] to regulate the practice of law [and hence the allowance of fees] ended in
1985 when the constitution was amended to explicitly grant the Utah Supreme Court
exclusive power to govern the practice of law[ ]”), and ¶28 (“[t]hus, any pre-1985 case
law discussing our shared power to regulate the practice of law [including fee
allowances] with the legislature is no longer valid[ ]”), and ¶34 (Art. VIII, §4, invalidates
prior holdings that legislature has role to play in regulation of attorney fees; “[e]ven if
[those rulings] correctly allowed the legislature to regulate fees at the time [they] were
decided, th[ese] decision[s] [have] been preempted by this court’s now exclusive
constitutional authority to regulate attorney fees[ ]”). Moreover, in a footnote discussing
and distinguishing certain language about pre-1985 power-sharing by the judiciary and
legislature in relation to attorneys and the practice of law found in the opinion of In re
Discipline of McCune, 717 P.2d 701 (Utah 1986), the Court implicitly holds that even its
“inherent” powers over attorney fees, flowing from Art. VIII, §1, cannot be touched by
legislative action. Injured Workers Association of Utah v. State, 2016 UT 21, ¶28 & n.6.
The facts and holding of the Injured Workers case underscore this language
respecting judicial exclusivity and the corresponding displacement of any role for the
legislative branch in the oversight of fees. Injured Workers struck down an agency rule
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which established a fee schedule in workers’ compensation proceedings because the
judicial power to regulate fees is “exclusive” and “non-delegable,” Injured Workers
Association of Utah v. State, 2016 UT 21, ¶3, in contradistinction to other cases
respecting Art. VIII where the Court has endorsed limited delegations of fact-finding,
administrative roles by agency panels. See, e.g., Vega v. Jordan Valley Medical Center,
L.P., 2019 UT 35, ¶15, (core judicial function of entering final judgment not delegable,
but fact-finding, scheduling proceedings, recommending solutions are tasks which can be
delegated to agencies in other departments of state government), citing State v. Thomas,
961 P.2d 299, 302 (Utah 1998). Consistent with this allocation of the power to regulate
fees, the Court declined to create its own fee schedule (such as one modeled after the
Utah Labor Commission rule), and, instead, chose to stand on existing guidelines for
attorney fees in the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules which, under Art. VIII,
§4, the Court has the exclusive power to adopt and promulgate. See, Injured Workers
Association of Utah v. State, 2016 UT 21, ¶¶35-42.
The Injured Workers opinion matters in this case because Judge Torgerson relied
upon legislative enactments when denying Grayeyes’s fee application – an application
which was predicated upon equitable principles fashioned from the judicial branch’s
inherent power to award fees. Grayeyes asked for fees under an equity-based bad faith
rule, but Judge Torgerson refused that request on statutory grounds, invoking §78B-5825. Grayeyes also asked for fees under the equity-based private attorney general
doctrine, but Judge Torgerson denied that request in light of §78B-5-825.5. Judge
Torgerson erred in both instances. He applied incorrect standards – legislative yardsticks
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rather than judicially formed, equitable measures -- in reviewing Grayeyes’s application
for fees.
2. In deciding whether fees should be awarded on account of “bad faith,” Judge
Torgerson should have applied the judicial branch’s equity test, rather than deferring
to the legislative directive found at §78B-5-825.
In Stewart v. Utah Public Service Comm’n, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994), this
Court held that the judicial branch has inherent authority to award attorney fees “when it
deems it appropriate in the interest of justice and equity.” (Citation omitted.) “Justice
and equity,” according to Stewart, require such awards “when a party acts in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Id. (Internal quotation marks and
citation omitted.) While Stewart adopted this test from Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4
(1973), a federal case, it could just as easily have been derived from earlier Utah
jurisprudence. E.g., Western Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Marchant, 615 P.2d 423, 427 (Utah
1980) (fees can be awarded where party lacks “good faith” in bringing suit, or was
“spiteful, contentious, or obstructive[ ]”); American States Ins. Co. v. Walker, 486 P.2d
1042, 1044 (Utah 1971) (court was within prerogative to award fees against party which
acted in “bad faith” or was “stubbornly litigious”). See also, Campbell v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, ¶127, rev’d on other grounds, 538 U. S. 408 (2003)
(litigation expenses awarded against insurer in light of “labored, vexatious . . .
burdensome . . . [and] oppressive defense”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
No single formula may capture the meaning of “equity and justice,” because
judicial pathways to equitable solutions must be left ungated, open, flexible, and
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adaptable to the nuanced circumstances of particular cases. Hughes v. Cafferty, 2004 UT
22, ¶¶26-27. Hence, in describing “bad faith,” Stewart, Marchant, and Walker, merely
name the usual suspects in the lineup of inequity, “wantonness,” “vexation,”
“spitefulness,” and “contention,” and even these are catalogued disjunctively because no
single factor, such as “lacking in merit,” is necessarily dispositive. Any one of them,
such as “oppression,” on occasion and standing alone, may suffice to trigger a court’s
discretion in assessing the propriety of fees. In Walker, cited above, for example, this
Court upheld an award of fees – on the basis of stubborn litigiousness – where an insurer
raised a coverage question offensively in one suit when it could have resolved identical
issues by acting defensively in another. The relative “merits” of the insurer’s position in
either suit was not a factor to be considered. Similarly, Laws also launched two
proceedings – with identical claims – against Grayeyes. These came in the wake of three
others – initiated by Laws’s surrogates – in 2018.14
Despite this, Judge Torgerson’s ruling cites and follows §78B-5-825, which
required Grayeyes to show “both” a lack of “merit” and “bad faith” in order to establish
his right to collect fees from Laws. Appendix B at 2. Judge Torgerson in fact held that,

14

Laws filed a petition against Grayeyes with the Lieutenant Governor under §§20A-1801, et seq., in addition to the instant case. Grayeyes moved to dismiss the 20A-1-801
proceeding after Judge Torgerson’s ruling in this case. Laws filed an opposition to that
motion to dismiss. As noted above, Laws’s surrogates also commenced proceedings
against Grayeyes in 2018. Laws’s son, Kendall, who is the San Juan County Attorney,
requested a criminal investigation of Grayeyes with the Davis County Attorney under
§20A-2-401(1)(a). Kendall Laws also participated in the effort to disenfranchise
Grayeyes – with the true objective of disqualifying him as a candidate – in the
proceedings started by Black and conducted by Nielson under §20A-3-202.3.
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because Laws’s residency claims had some merit, 15 it was unnecessary to explore his
subjective intent in seeking to remove Grayeyes from office – and, by implication, any of
the other factors, such as oppression, which might have been considered on equitable
grounds. Appendix B at 2-3. This analysis is puzzling, since the original version of
§78B-5-825 became law in 1981, long before Stewart was decided in 1994, yet Stewart
not only fails to make note of this statute but also formulated an equitable test for bad
faith – pursuant to this Court’s inherent power – which is radically different from the one
set forth in that legislation.
Judge Torgerson then reinforced these statutory limitations (with their
corresponding interdiction of wider-ranging equitable circumstances) by refusing to
allow discovery and to hold an evidentiary hearing, measures which would have
unhitched the fee question from its legislative mooring and enabled the court to row more
freely in equitable waters. Judge Torgerson thus allowed a legislative decree, §78B-5825, unconstitutionally to constrain the equitable test for bad faith which had been
fashioned pursuant to the judiciary’s inherent judicial power.
This surely was incorrect – and not merely because, under the Injured Workers
rationale, it is a violation of the separation of powers. If applied, like Judge Torgerson
did here, as the exclusive measure for awarding fees when litigation-related conduct is
drawn into question, §78B-5-825 would unduly hamstring the judicial branch in the

15

Nevertheless, Laws had no meritorious argument in opposition to the laches defense,
and that basis for dismissal, as the case law cited above makes clear, applies here
regardless of any merit in his case-in-chief.
74 | P a g e

performance of its core judicial function of “determin[ing] controversies between adverse
parties and questions in litigation[.]” Timpanogos Planning and Water Management
Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy District, 690 P.2d 562, 569 (Utah 1984).
Here’s why.
The administration of justice depends largely on the power of judges adequately to
supervise and control the parties appearing before them – as well as the officers of court
who are in service to those parties. Judicial rules for awarding or withholding fees play
an essential role in this regard. See, e.g., In re State in Interest of Woodward, 384 P.2d
110 (Utah 1963) (power to use remedial tools such as fines, forfeitures, and penalties
belongs exclusively to judicial branch and legislative enactment which gave Public
Welfare Commission general supervisory authority over juvenile courts’ exercise of this
power constituted violation of Arts. VIII and V). Hence, it is well-established that courts,
at trial or on appeal, have power, inherently or by rule, to sanction parties or control their
counsel with the hammer and claw of fees and costs. E.g., Barnard v. Wassermann, 853
P.2d 243, 248-249 (Utah 1993) (trial courts have inherent power, independent of statutes,
to manage cases, disincentivize delay, and forestall inconvenience, by imposing
sanctions); Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, ¶13 (attorney fees and double costs awarded
pursuant to Utah R. App. Pro 33(c)(1) against party who brought frivolous petition).
Judicial authority in the dispensation of fees not only serves these important
purposes in case management but also is essential to the integrity of courts and the
appearance of justice. This inherent equitable power enables our courts at once “to
compensate the wronged party, punish the wrongdoer, and protect the integrity of the
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court.” 10 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, §54.171[2][c][i], at 54-283 (3d ed. 2019).
Consistent with its equitable origins, the power can be exercised and fees assessed against
either a party or his counsel. Id. at 54-283--54-284, citing Lockary v. Kayfetz, 974 F.2d
1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 1992). And because this power is integral to the court’s own
integrity, as well as cost-effective management of the cases in its docket, it is “beyond
any democratic controls.” 10 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, §54.171[2][c][iii], at
54-288.
In short, Judge Torgerson applied an incorrect legal standard in reviewing
Grayeyes’s application for fees insofar as that application was based upon the rubric of
“bad faith.” Judge Torgerson used a legislative bridle when he should have given judicial
rein to his equitable instincts, and considered “oppression,” “vexation,” and “stubborn
litigiousness,” rather than “merit” to the exclusion of all other factors, in determining
whether fees should be allowed. The ruling on bad faith attorney fees therefore should be
reversed and remanded so that he may be given an opportunity, through discovery and an
evidentiary hearing, to evaluate the appropriateness of fees in light of the full-range of
equitable circumstances in this case.
3. Judge Torgerson erred in concluding that the legislative proscription in §78B5-825.5 barred him from considering an allowance of fees under the judicially created
private attorney general doctrine.
The Stewart opinion also held that, pursuant to the judiciary’s “inherent equitable”
power, fee allowances could be made under the private attorney general doctrine.
Stewart v. Utah Public Serv. Comm’n, 885 P.2d at 783. In 2009, however, the Utah
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legislature passed §78B-5-825.5 which states that, “A court may not award fees under the
private attorney general doctrine in any action filed after May 12, 2009.” Judge
Torgerson ruled that Injured Workers did not overrule §78B-5-825.5, because Injured
Workers applied only to private contracts between attorneys and clients and had no
application to fee awards against non-prevailing parties in ordinary litigation. Appendix
B at 5. Judge Torgerson, therefore, concluded that “this statute [§78B-5-825.5] is binding
upon the Court,” Appendix B at 4, and accordingly refused to allow fees under the
private attorney general doctrine. For reasons given below, we submit this conclusion is
mistaken.
a. Judge Torgerson misread the Injured Workers rationale.
The rationale of Injured Workers cannot be limited to fee relationships between an
attorney and his client, as suggested by Judge Torgerson. As noted above, the Court’s
reasoning is largely based upon the “inherent power” of Utah’s courts, and thus draws a
direct line to the Stewart decision and other authorities, discussed below, where that
power has been exercised to order parties to pay the fees of opposing, rather than
personal, counsel.
Injured Workers also reasons analogically from the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct, which regulate fee arrangements respecting parties outside the conventional
attorney-client relationship. These include, for example, Rule 1.5(e) which governs feesplitting between attorneys. See also, Christensen & Jensen, P.C. v. Barrett & Daines,
2008 UT 64, ¶¶40-48 (fee allocation dispute between law firms properly adjusted through
exercise of judicial branch’s equity powers). Fee-splitting between attorneys and third77 | P a g e

party non-attorneys likewise is regulated as a matter of professional ethics. See
generally, C. W. Wolfram, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, §9.2.4, at 509-513, and §16.3.1,
at 895 (1986). Even when the sharing of fees has been disguised through an assignment
of claims, the evils associated with fee-splitting, which may include the unauthorized
practice of law, have been enjoined by this Court. See, Nelson v. Smith, 154 P.2d 634,
639 & 641-642 (Utah 1944). These ethical concerns are related to regulatory constraints
respecting non-lawyer investment in legal enterprises, see, e.g., Wolfram, §16.2.1, at 878879, a subject-area recently addressed in the Report and Recommendations of the Utah
Work Group on Regulatory Reform, NARROWING THE ACCESS-TO-JUSTICE GAP
BY REIMAGINING REGULATION (August, 2019).
Utah’s Code of Professional Conduct, in Rule 1.8(f) & comments 11 and 12, also
governs a third-party’s payment of fees to an attorney on behalf of his client, as well as a
variation on that theme, in Rule 1.8(i) & comment 16, when champertous litigation is
maintained by the attorney himself or a litigation investor. These concerns are traditional
to the practice of law, not only because they may divide an attorney’s loyalty from his
client’s interest, but also because they may have a corrupting influence on the judicial
branch and the administration of justice. See, In re Evans, 62 P. 913, 919 (Utah 1900)
(attorney accused of champerty subject to summary jurisdiction of trial court “not for the
purpose of punishment but for the protection of the court, the proper administration of
justice, the dignity and purity of the profession, the public good, and the protection of
clients[ ]”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The rules respecting
champerty and maintenance were carried forward, in 1981, when this Court used its
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inherent power to integrate the Bar by rule. See, In re Integration and Governance of
Utah State Bar, 632 P.2d 845, 846-847 (Utah 1981) and In re Disciplinary Action of
McCune, 717 P.2d 701, 704-705 (Utah 1986).16 And the Court’s analysis in Injured
Workers Association of Utah v. State, 2016 UT 21, ¶20, clearly relies, in the broadest
sense, on this circumstance in support of its decision.
Finally, in the course of illustrating the extended scope of the judiciary’s inherent,
exclusive power to regulate the practice of law and the allowance of fees, and contrary to
Judge Torgerson’s narrower interpretation, Injured Workers relied directly on precedents
where the Court had assumed jurisdiction in relation to parties outside the ordinary
attorney-client relationship. Thus, the Court cited approvingly Utah State Bar v.
Summerhayes & Hayden, 905 P.2d 867 (Utah 1995) which upheld restraints upon socalled third-party adjusters who were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and In
re Disciplinary Action of McCune, 717 P.2d 701 (Utah 1986) which enjoined an attorney
to remit settlement funds to a third-party vendor and other professionals. Injured
Workers makes clear that this order affecting third parties was justified by the judiciary’s
then-existing “inherent power,” and implicitly confirms that this power, by virtue of the
1985 revisions to Art. VIII, now has become “exclusive.” Injured Workers Association
of Utah v. State, 2016 UT 21, ¶¶29, 28 & n. 6.

16

As a result of integration, the Court adopted virtually all prior statutory regulation of
lawyers, fees, and litigation finance, re-promulgating them in “Rules for Integration and
Management of the Utah State Bar.” Rule (C) 26. f. provided that it is the duty of
attorneys, “Not to encourage either the commencement or continuance of an action or
proceeding from any corrupt motive or passion or interest.”
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b. Section 78B-5-825.5 violates Art. VIII, §1, by usurping the inherent power of
courts to fashion equitable remedies, and Art VIII, §4, by interfering with the exclusive
power of courts to regulate the practice of law including attorney fees.
Nor can we accept, as Judge Torgerson did below, the proposition that certain
questions respecting fee regulation may be placed, by legislative fiat, outside the reach of
judicial disposition – in other words, that fee allocations don’t always strike at the very
center of the practice of law and the operation of courts.
Respecting the practice of law, the language in Injured Workers on this point
could not be clearer: “Regulating attorney fees goes to the very heart of the practice of
law, inasmuch as it involves assessment of the quality, amount, and value of legal
services related to a legal problem.” Injured Workers Association of Utah v. State, 2016
UT 21, ¶33.
Insofar as the operation of courts is involved, access to justice has always been a
central concern of the judicial branch and the legal profession. This concern is reflected,
for example, in Rules 6 and 7 of the Utah Code of Professional Conduct which have been
promulgated by this Court. And this Court, through invocation of its “inherent” power,
historically has addressed that concern through negative means and positive inducements.
On the negative side, it has conscripted (without pay) counsel to serve indigent
defendants, Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 133 P.2d 325 (Utah 1943),17 and appointed (with

17

Injured Workers Association of Utah v. State, 2016 UT 21, ¶28, overruled Ruckenbrod
v. Mullins, 133 P.2d 325 (Utah 1943), insofar as Ruckenbrod permitted the legislature a
role in the allocation of fees. But Ruckenbrod’s other holdings, those in support of the
inherent power of the judicial branch to govern attorneys and regulate fees, remain intact.
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uncertain prospect of financial remuneration) attorneys to represent non-indigent, absent
parties, Burke v. Lewis, 2005 UT 44. On the positive front, it has used its “inherent”
power to fashion an equitable award of attorney fees for the appointed counsel in Burke,
Doctors’ Co. v. Drezga, 2009 UT 60, ¶36, and, using that same “inherent” equitable
power, it has authorized fee awards to counsel who otherwise might not have received
pay in cases where a public interest or collective good or the interests of justice would be
served, Stewart v. Utah Public Serv. Comm’n, 885 P.2d 759, 782-783 (Utah 1994).
As these cases show – where the Court has flexed its inherent, equitable muscle to
afford representation in difficult situations -- the key to judicial access chiefly is turned
through the legal profession and, as a practical matter, often depends on how and by
whom that litigation can be financed. In other words, ordinary folk usually cannot gain
access to judicial proceedings absent the retention of counsel, and “[i]t is the attorney
who first sits as judge of the merits of every case, who decides whether or not suit should
be commenced. The court and the public are interested in having that decision rendered
by those qualified so to do to avoid, as much as possible, needless litigation and to have
those cases upon which suits are deemed advisable properly prepared so that they will
move through the process of trial with as few snarls as possible.” Nelson v. Smith, 154

Ruckenbrod reasoned that attorneys who were pressed into unpaid service for indigent
clients got a fair exchange in light of their fellowship in a bar organization governed
through the inherent power of the judicial branch and thus free from legislative restraint.
Id. at 330. This circumstance further was justified, according to Ruckenbrod, because
“[i]t seems to be the universal rule that a court has the inherent power and authority to
incur and order paid all such expenses as are necessary for the holding of court and the
administration of its duties[.]” (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)
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P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1944). This ordinarily costs money since the practice of law, by
judicial definition, for the most part, is done for profit or “gain.” Id. at 638. And these
are “established principles” concerning the “practice of law” which are subject to change
only through the judicial department. Id. at 637 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Put differently, fee arrangements and all forms of litigation financing are the
driving force in getting to court, staying there, and successful prosecution of a case, either
offensively or defensively. This is a central reality of legal practice and judicial
administration. It is the very reality which prompted the recently issued Report and
Recommendations of the Utah Work Group on Regulatory Reform, NARROWING THE
ACCESS-TO-JUSTICE GAP BY REIMAGINING REGULATION (August 2019). And
we see this reality played out on a regular basis in actual proceedings – when someone is
denied a day in court because he can’t afford the legal expense of processing a claim or –
if the case gets filed, when progress is stalled because he fails to pay or is slow in paying
his bill or -- when the well-heeled client, with top grade counsel, has the advantage over
an impecunious opponent. Regardless of the merits of a cause, the expense of counsel
often will dictate the outcome in that case -- when, for instance, it simply makes no
economic sense to resist a twenty thousand dollar claim where the gamble of trial will
take a bet – in the form of fees and costs -- which equals or exceeds the amount in
controversy.
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In fact, Utah’s primary regulation – the court-made American Rule18 -- for the
allocation of fees in civil litigation is a reflection of these realities and itself represents a
deliberate choice in relation to the economics of litigation – that is, underwriting for a
case and the affordability of counsel – and how these factors should be balanced either to
encourage or impede a litigant’s progress to court or defense against claims. For
example, the first Utah case we can find on this subject endorses the American Rule
because it opens courts for the vindication of rights and the redress of wrongs: “The
courts of this state are always open to all for the redress of grievances and the protection
of legal rights, and in our judgment they should refrain from allowing the imposition of

18

Because the judicial power to regulate fees has such a long and sometimes ambiguous
history, it is easy to forget that Utah’s adoption of the so-called American Rule is itself an
expression of that very power. Even in the days, prior to Bar integration and Art. VIII’s
amendment, when the legislature, by statute, had a sometime role in attorney regulation,
this Court believed itself at perfect liberty to announce a doctrine which governed the
allocation of counsel fees in contested litigation and, then, as discussed at greater length
below, to create exceptions, at its independent will, to that doctrine, including those
where, in equity, special circumstances justify a departure from the primary rule that each
side must engage in litigation at its own expense.
Judicial independence from the legislative branch in fashioning the American Rule also
might be shown by reference to a legislative directive which has existed in Utah since
statehood and now is found at §68-3-1. This legislation always has required Utah’s courts
to give priority, as a rule of decision in the absence of statute, to the English common
law. The English common law, however, followed the English Rule which required
losers to pay the winners’ fees in litigation and was so called in order to avoid confusion
with the American Rule which dictated the opposite result. In other words, it appears that
this Court, in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co v. Love and other cases, may have adopted the
American Rule in direct contravention of a statutory edict to give priority to the English
Rule. This suggests, even more forcibly, that the American Rule itself is an expression of
the independent, exclusive power of Utah courts to fashion, modify, and extend rules
concerning attorney fees, a power which, like other essential judicial powers, cannot be
curtailed by legislative enactments.
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costs and expenses upon the losing party . . . “ St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. Love, 195 P.
305, 311 (Utah 1921).
Federal precedents showcase the same issue, wondering “[o]n what principle of
justice can a plaintiff wrongfully run down on a public highway recover his doctor’s bill
but not his lawyer’s bill?” but worrying whether “the poor might be unjustly discouraged
from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees
of their opponents’ counsel.” F. D. Rich Co., Inc. v. United States, 417 U. S. 116, 128129 (1974) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 19

Injured Workers also

confirms the centrality of fees to the accessibility of justice by examining how fee awards
and rates for payment affect the availability and quality of counsel who are willing to
perform services in workers’ compensation cases. Injured Workers Association of Utah
v. State, 2016 UT 21, ¶¶35-39.20

19

The court in Rich also noted that the American Rule has been supported on the ground
that it spares judges from the extra burden of trying cases over the allowance of fees and
on the further basis that a contrary approach, where fees are assessed against a losing
party, may have a negative impact on independent advocacy “by having the earnings of
the attorney flow from the pen of the judge before whom he argues.” F. D. Rich Co., Inc.
v. United States, 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974). Ethical complications brought about through
fee-shifting departures from the American Rule – whether those departures occur as a
result of statutory reform or judge-made rules – also are flagged and discussed in C. W.
Wolfram, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, §16.6.4, at 931-932 (1986). All of these issues,
like the economics of litigation, go to the heart of attorney conduct and judicial
administration and, thus, argue that they should be addressed exclusively in the judicial
department of state government.
20

The legal literature on the American Rule, which is extensive, invariably notes that the
Rule has been adopted as an economic prod in furtherance of certain policies of judicial
administration, such as freer access to court systems, reduced work-loads, and more
disinterested counsel. See, e.g., Bartholomew and Yamen, “The American Rule: The
Genesis and Policy of the Enduring Legacy on Attorney Fee Awards, UTAH BAR
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Utah’s exceptions to the American Rule exemplify these same points. All
exceptions have been created or endorsed by the courts, and, therefore, reaffirm the
primacy of judicial power in regulating fees. 21 All of them likewise reflect concern about

JOURNAL, September/October 2017, at 16-18; Carney, “’Loser Pays’ – Justice for the
Poorest and the Richest, Others Need Not Apply,” UTAH BAR JOURNAL, May, 1995,
at 18-20; Judge J. Thomas Greene, “The Need for Cautious and Deliberate Reforms in
the Civil Justice System,” UTAH BAR JOURNAL, August/September, 1995, at 46-47.
21

When deciding whether fees should be awarded in a given case, Utah courts generally
begin by announcing our state’s policy, under the American Rule, that fees are not
assessed unless a contract or statute provides otherwise. This formula, through repetition,
may give the impression that the legislature, by statute, has a shared or supervening
authority insofar as fee regulation is concerned. But, as Injured Workers was careful to
note, this impression is a by-product of a foregone age when fee regulation was an
interdepartmental function, and, moreover, ignores the point that the American Rule –
including the exceptions for contract and statute – from the beginning was the offspring
of judicial power, a fact which has been repeatedly confirmed over the years by the
judicial branch’s ongoing creation of additional exceptions.
Judicial primacy over the creation of exceptions to the American Rule further is
demonstrated by the case law which subjects even those exceptions to judicial control.
For example, Utah courts have created a contract exception to application of the
American Rule, but they still have primary supervisory power in interpreting and
applying that exception for contracts as well as construing and applying the contracts
themselves which come within the purview of the exception.
Injured Workers illustrates both points. Recall that the Labor Commission rule at issue
disregarded and refused to enforce whatever fee agreements existed between injured
workers and retained attorneys. This substitution of agency rates for private contracts in
one sense violated the judicially created American Rule which permitted the contractual
allocation of fees between parties to litigation and, by inference, between one of those
parties and his personal attorney. In addition, the Injured Workers opinion makes it clear
that any abrogation or award of fees in a litigation contest may occur only with the
judiciary’s blessing. Since this power cannot be delegated to the legislature or its
designated agency, Injured Workers disapproved the Labor Commission rule which nixed
the worker-counsel contracts. And as witness to the judicial power exclusively to
extinguish any right to fees, contractual or otherwise, Injured Workers approvingly cites
the Dahl case which denied enforcement to an attorney fee contract which violated the
85 | P a g e

core issues affecting the judicial branch, such as case management, and access to justice
so that important rights do not suffer for want of vindication. This certainly is true for the
equity-based bad faith exception discussed above. And it similarly follows for private
attorneys general as well as other litigants, favored with additional, but different,
exceptions, creatures of the judiciary’s inherent, equitable power, which have been
formulated and expanded over the years.22
All of these fee allocations, exceptions all to the American Rule, are based upon
the judicial branch’s “inherent, equity” power or “inherent” general authority. This

Code of Professional Conduct. See, Injured Workers Association of Utah v. State, 2016
UT 21, ¶41.
Utah courts likewise have created an exception for statutes in connection with the
American rule, but they may use their inherent, exclusive power to strike down such
statutes when they unduly invade judicial prerogatives, see, e.g., Injured Workers
Association of Utah v. State, 2016 UT 21, ¶3, or otherwise to construe them in a manner
that is consistent with judicially created equitable guidelines. See, e.g., Bilanzich v.
Lonetti, 2007 UT 26 (imposing equitable controls on Utah’s reciprocal attorney fees
statute).
22

These include, without limitation, Stewart v. Utah Public Service Comm’n, 885 P.2d at
782 (legal service which creates a common fund for benefit of others); Hughes v.
Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, ¶22 (recoveries from trustees for maladministration of trust);
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, ¶122, rev’d on other grounds,
538 U. S. 408 (2003) (recoveries for breach of fiduciary duties), Capson v. Brisbois, 592
P.2d 583, 585 (Utah 1979) (fee allocations to plaintiffs with clean hands who interplead
funds), citing Gresham v. O and K Construction Company, 370 P.2d 726, 736-737 (Ore.
1962), on rehearing, 372 P.2d 187, 188 (Ore. 1962) (court had power in equity to “adjust
the liability of all of the parties before it,” even though it only was in the nature of an
interpleader action); Doctors’ Co. v. Drezga, 2009 UT 60, ¶¶31-38 (fees for counsel who
was judicially conscripted to represent non-indigent, but absent, party in dispute
respecting insurance coverage); LeVanger v. Highland Estates Properties Owners Ass’n,
Inc., 2003 UT App 377, ¶20 (fees allowed were a litigant confers substantial benefit on
an identifiable class).
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accordingly – assuming synonymous usage of the word “inherent” -- should put them on
a par with those functions which Taylor v. Lee, 226 P.2d 531, 537 (Utah 1951) deemed
“primary,” “core,” “essential,” and “so inherently . . . judicial that they must be exercised
exclusively by [the judicial] department[ ].” The exercise of this inherent equitable
power in creating bad faith and private attorneys general exceptions to the American Rule
accordingly should be immune from interference by the legislative branch.
c. Section 78B-5-825.5 violates Art. VIII, §4, by usurping this Court’s
rulemaking power.
Under Art. VIII, §4, this Court has rulemaking power which is shared, to some
extent, with the legislative department. Brown v. Cox, 2017 UT 3, ¶¶15-24, however,
held that this Court has first dibs on promulgating rules; only after it acts may the
legislature come forward – with the requisite supermajorities -- to counter or modify that
enactment. In other words, the Supreme Court “adopts rules” and the Legislature only
may “amend” what the Supreme Court in the first instance has adopted. Id. at ¶¶17 and
21-24. Section 78B-5-825.5 impermissibly may intrude upon this Court’s rulemaking
power – especially its power to decide, in the first place, whether there should be a
particular rule respecting attorney fees. 23
This Court has exercised this supervening power to adopt rules, insofar as attorney
fees are concerned, with great care. It has promulgated rules which bear upon the

23

Grayeyes obviously makes this argument in the alternative. He believes, as contended
above, that the judicial branch has the exclusive power to regulate fees under Injured
Workers Association of Utah v. State, 2016 UT 21, ¶¶26-28.
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regulation of fee awards in several instances. See, e.g, Utah R. Civ. Pro. 11, 16, 54, 37,
and 65,24 and Utah R. App. Pro. 33. But, in other contexts – because equity awards must
remain adaptable to a variety of circumstances -- it has eschewed rulemaking as a means
to process the allocation of fees. E.g., Hughes v. Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, ¶¶26-27.
Put differently, Utah courts, as a rule, don’t award attorney fees. That, after all, is
the judge-made American Rule. Departures from this Rule, the equitable exceptions for
bad faith litigation or private attorneys general, are exactly that, fee awards, in
exceptional circumstances, which depend upon discretionary exercises of judicial power.
Unlike “codifications” found in, say, Rule 37(d), the Court here has decided that these
types of awards, because they are exceptional and equitable in character, are not
amenable to rulemaking and, accordingly, should not be promulgated as rules.
Section 78B-5-825.5, on the other hand, declares that there shall be a rule
respecting the allocation of attorney fees in a particular equitable circumstance -- when

24

Rule 65B(c), in particular, is very close to the heart of this case, since quo warranto is
the extraordinary writ which traditionally must be used to determine whether an
officeholder such as Grayeyes truly is qualified or eligible to hold an office on grounds of
residency or otherwise. See, e.g., State v. Christensen, 35 P.2d 775, 782 (Utah 1934)
(“[q]uo warranto, or a proceeding in the nature thereof, is a proper and appropriate
remedy to test the right or title to an office[ ]”) (citation and elisions omitted). Petitioners
seeking a writ of quo warranto must post “an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay
any judgment for costs and damages that may be recovered against [them].” Although
few cases address this issue, it appears that the “damages” contemplated in these
proceedings include attorney fees. See, e.g., Colorado Development Co. v. Creer, 80
P.2d 914, 920-921 (Utah 1938) (“damages” as used in former statute which memorialized
entitlement to writ of mandamus means attorney fees). See also, Timpanogos Planning
and Water Management Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy District, 690 P.2d
562, 569 (Utah 1984) (bonding power is judicial power)
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this Court has opined that rules respecting fee allocations, where equity is in play, are
entirely inappropriate. This offends Art. VIII, §4, as interpreted in Brown, by preempting
this Court’s power to decide, in the first instance, what shall be a rule and, in the event,
when and pursuant to what terms and conditions, it shall be promulgated.
In conclusion, Judge Torgerson’s denial of fees should be reversed and that aspect
of the case remanded so that Grayeyes may be allowed to prove, in the first instance and
unimpeded by §78B-5-525.5, that he is an appropriate private attorney general and
worthy of a fee award.
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION
Laws’s appeal should be dismissed or denied. He lacks standing. He was
untimely and tardy in bringing suit. He also failed to prove that the election of Grayeyes
to the office of San Juan County Commissioner should be undone.
Judge Torgerson’s ruling on attorney fees and court costs should be reversed.
Sections 78B-5-825 and 78B-5-825.5 were unconstitutionally applied in this case to the
Grayeyes fee application. This aspect of the proceeding should be returned to Judge
Torgerson so that, after brief discovery and an evidentiary hearing, he can apply correct
legal standards to determine whether, in the first instance, fees and costs should be
allowed under the full range of equitable circumstances which inform the bad faith and
private attorney general doctrines.
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Dated this 11th day of March, 2020.

/ s / Alan L. Smith___________________
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______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
______________________________________________________________________________
)
KELLY LAWS,
)
)
RESPONDENT’S NOTICE
Petitioner,
)
OF APPEAL
)
v.
)
)
Case No. SJ180700016
WILLIE GRAYEYES,
)
)
Judge: Don M. Torgerson
Respondent.
)
)
______________________________________________________________________________
Respondent Willie Grayeyes, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby appeals the
final order and judgment in the above-captioned case denying Respondent’s application for fees
and costs, entered on June 20, 2019, to the Utah Supreme Court, which has authority to hear this
appeal pursuant to Rules 4 (b) (2) and 4 (d), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Utah Code
Ann., § 78A-3-102 and Utah Code Ann., § 20A-4-406. The appeal is taken from the entire
Ruling and Order which was entered on June 20, 2019.
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Dated June 25, 2019.
/ s / Alan L. Smith___________________
Alan L. Smith

/s/ David R. Irvine
David R. Irvine

MAYNES, BRADFORD, SHIPPS
& SHEFTEL, LLP
/s/ Steven C. Boos
Steven C. Boos

/s/ Eric P Swenson
Eric P. Swenson

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on June 25, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing Notice of
Appeal with the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for San Juan County, State of Utah.
Notice will be electronically mailed to the following individuals representing Petitioner Kelly
Laws:
PETER STIRBA
MATTHEW STROUT
PAMELA BEATSE
STIRBA, P.C.
215 S. State Street, Suite 750
P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0810
Telephone: (801) 364-8300
Fax: (801) 364-8355
Email: peter@stirba.com
mstrout@stirba.com
/s/ Suzanne P. Singley
Suzanne P. Singley
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